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THREE CASES / FOUR TALES: COMMONS, CAPTURE, THE
PUBLIC TRUST, AND PROPERTY IN LAND
BY
DALE D. GOBLE*
The founding of America was the rule of capture writ large-the
discovery doctrine is just capture applied to continents rather than
foxes. But capture produces potentially different results when applied
to foxes rather than to continents: 'property" in foxes is qualified and
possessory because the property ceases if the fox escapes-and
animals ferae naturae (unlike continents) are wont to escape. Tis
article examines the legal universe occupied by animals ferae naturae
by examining three cases from the early nineteenth century. The cases
examine the rule of capture as applied to animals ferae naturae, the
nature of property in such animals, and how that property restricts
property in land
The past is a foreign country. they do thing differently there.
LP Hartley'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judges-like the rest of us-tell stories to explain their decisions. Thus
this article becomes a twice-told tale of the stories three courts told about
animals ferae naturae.2 The first story-originally written by the New York
Supreme Court-is an allegory about the killing of a fox.3 The New Jersey
Supreme Court of Judicature wrote the second story to justify its decision
on the ownership of oysters growing in the tidal reaches of the Raritan
River.4 In the final narrative, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
weighed the balance between public and private rights in determining who
must pay for the modifications to permit anadromous fish to pass upstream
over a dam to spawn.5
The three cases examine four recurrent topics in natural resource law:
common property, capture, private property, and the public trust. The first
case-the story of Pierson, Post, and the fox-is a story of how things come
to be private property by capture from the commons. The tale of the Raritan
oysters suggests a limit on the fox story: the government's responsibility as a
trustee for the public to protect common property from private
appropriation. Finally, the story of the shad and alewives, and Baker and
Vose's milldam on the Neponset River, also examines questions of public
trust/common property, but from the perspective of private property in land:
its lesson is that such property is subordinate to the public's interest in
wildlife.
6
Each of the cases probes a different aspect of the balance between
public and private. What scope of unchecked autonomy is to be accorded
the individual? What does the individual owe to society? The early
2 On the common-law distinctions among animals ferae naturae, mansuetae naturae, and
domitae naturae, and the differences that flow from these classifications, see DALE D. GOBLE &
ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW 104-05 (2002). On the continuing relevance of the
classifications, see, for example, State v. Couch, 103 P.3d 671 (Or. App. 2004), and State v.
Lessard, 29 P.2d 509 (Or. 1934).
3 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
4 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L 1 (1821).
5 Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 522 (1808).
6 There is at least one additional story that provides an archetype for natural resources and
environmental law: "nuisance." This story is either about protecting the public interest against
private land uses ("public nuisances") or about adjusting mutually interfering land uses
("private nuisances"). On the former, see Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 530
(1807), and Boatwn'ght v. Bookman, 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 447, 451 (1839) (noting that "an obstruction
to the free passage of fish in a public navigable river, is also a public nuisance"). On the latter,
see Commonwealth v. Chapin, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 199, 202-03 (1827) (holding that a private right
in a fishery on a stream is "subject to a reasonable qualification, in order to protect the rights of
others, who, in virtue of owning the soil, have the same right, but might lose all advantage from
it, if their neighbours below them on a stream or river might with impunity wholly impede the
passage of fish" and thus the obstruction complained of may be a nuisance at the common law),
and Seaman v. Lee, 10 Hun. 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1877) (holding upstream pollution that killed
trout could be enjoined as a nuisance).
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nineteenth century has particular relevance to these questions. During this
period, federal and state judges worked to reconfigure the common law to
account for two ongoing revolutions: the political revolution from monarchy
to republic, and the economic-social revolution from agrarian-
communitarian to market-individualistic.7
Animals ferae naturae also have a particular relevance to these issues.
As Locke wrote a century earlier, "In the beginning, all the world was
America"-by which he meant, in the state of nature all the world was
unowned and available for the taking.9 For Locke and the Enlightenment
civilians (Grotius,1 ° Pufendorf, 1 Barbeyrac,12 Bynkershoek,13 and Vattel' a)
7 In this, the three cases share the search for a coherent legal system that occupied the
early nineteenth century. See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES (Paul
Finkelman & David Cobin eds., Law Book Exchange 1999) (1803). Different parts of this story
can be traced in CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 3-68 (1981);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 105-333 (2d ed. 1985); GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 19-40 (1977); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 9-128 (1989); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 71-108 (1956); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW 165-74 (1975); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FiNKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 248-70
(2d ed. 2002); and J.R. Pole, Property and Law in the American Republic, in PATHS TO THE
AMERICAN PAST 75-108 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979).
8 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 319 (P. Laslett ed., Cambridge University
Press 1967) (1690).
9 Locke was the secretary to the British Board of Trade (which was responsible for
managing the colonies) during the 1670s, and his philosophical writings echo the legal
justification for dispossessing the indigenous peoples of North America: Indians, who "do but
na over the grass" like "wild beasts," had no more claim to ownership than did the beasts.
Robert Cushman, Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawfulness of Removing Out of
England into the Parts of Amerieca, in CHRONICLES OF THE PILGRIM FATHERS 243 (Da Capo Press
1971)(1841). See generally Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal
Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and their Signitcance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural
Resources Poliey in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713 (2004) (arguing that the Marshall Court's
"discovery doctrine" did not by itself divest tribes of their property rights, but that subsequent
courts and congresses construed the Marshall Court's rhetoric to breach treaties and break up
Indian lands).
10 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch jurist and humanist who wrote what is usually
considered to be the first definitive work on international law, De Jure Belli ac Pais [On the
Law of WarandPeace], which was published in 1646.
11 Samuel, Baron von Pufendorf (1632-1694), a German jurist and historian, was educated
on the works of Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. In 1672, he published De Jure Naturae et Gentium
[On the Law of Nature and of Nations].
12 Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) was a French legal theorist and historian. He annotated
editions of both Grotius' On the Law of War and Peace and Pufendorfs The Law of Nature and
of Nations. He corresponded with John Locke and advocated the English philosopher's theories
in his extensive notes on Pufendorfs treatise.
13 Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673-1743) was a Dutch writer on international law and a
jurist at The Hague. In 1702, he published De dominio mais [Sovereignty of the Sea] which
proposed the three-mile limit to a state's jurisdiction over the sea. In 1702, the range of a canon
was a league, or three marine miles. James Brown Scott, Introduction to CORNELIUS VAN
BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARiS DISERTATIO 11, 17 (Ralph van Deman Magoffm trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1923) (1744).
14 Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) was a Swiss philosopher and jurist whose fame was based on
a single book, DROIT DES GENS; OU, PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
animals ferae naturae were the paradigm of an unowned thing; they were a
then-current analogue for the "state of nature," that imagined and imaginary
starting point for society. 5 Wildlife law, in short, has often been about more
than wildlife, it has often been a speculation about "property." And in the
first decades of the nineteenth century, this speculation occurred in a place
that seemed to be defined by riotously exuberant abundance.16 How did this
anomalous situation affect the debate and shape assumptions? Were things
truly unowned even in such a place?
AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONES ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS] (Joseph Chitty
ed., Philadelphia 1876) (1758). The book was important because it supplied a justification for
liberal revolutions. Thus it is not surprising that Vattel's ideas were warmly received in this
country. James Kent wrote that Vattel is "[tihe most popular and most elegant writer on the law
of nations" and noted that "[hie has been cited, for the last half century, more freely than any
one of the public jurists." 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 18 (Claitor's Publ'g
1985) (1826).
15 The fundamental perspective shared by these writers (other than Vattel) was that in the
state-of-nature, man was a solitary individual without social relationships. This reductionist
perspective reflects the Newtonian, "scientific" (.e., mechanical) perspective: complex systems
could be understood by reducing the system to its simplest constituents and describing those
constituents; nature is a collection of bodies moving through Euclidean space. This perspective
achieved perhaps its clearest statement in the writings of Thomas Hobbes:
it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man
against every man .... Whatsoever, therefore, is consequent to a time of war where
every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live
without other security that what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish
them withal. In such condition.., the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. I, ch. 13 (1651). See also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLICAL
THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 3 (1962) (describing that the central difficulty with liberal
democratic theory beginning with Hobbes is its view that "freedom is a function of possession"
and that "[slociety consists of relations of exchange between proprietors."). This perspective
was not shared by many common-law jurists of the period. See in/la notes 178-88 and
accompanying text.
16 The first stories from America were tales of limitless bounty: "I think in all the world the
like abundance is not to be found," stated Arthur Barlowe, Sir Walter Raleigh's agent, after
Raleigh's trip to Virginia in 1584. Quoted in ANTHONY NETBOY, THE ATLANTIC SALMON 315 (1968).
Thomas Morton described a Massachusetts with "Fowles in abundance, Fish in multitude,
and... Millions of Turtledoves on the greene boughes: which sate pecking, of the full ripe
pleasant grapes, that were supported by the lusty trees." THOMAS MORTON, NEw ENGLISH CANAAN
60 (photo. reprint 1969) (Amsterdam 1637). Richard Whitbourne, when describing the now-
extinct great auk, spoke of its ability to "multiply so infinitly," and of God's gift of "the
innocency of so poore a creature, to become such an admirable instrument for the sustenation
of man." RICHARD WHITBOURNE, A DISCOURSE AND DISCOVERY OF NEW-FOUND-LAND 9 (photo.
reprint 1971) (London 1620). That description captured two of the central precepts of the
period: nature was both inexhaustibly fecund and created for the sustenance of our species; it
was a vast and continuously replenished storehouse.
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I. PIERSON v PosT TAING THINGS FROM THE COMMONS
A. Capture as Possession
The law often embodies its foundational propositions in stripped-down,
mythic allegories. Pierson, Post, and the fox is one such story-a tale that
offers a partial answer to what Carol Rose, in a long tradition of legal
philosophers, has called "a fundamental puzzle for anyone who thinks about
property": "how do things come to be owned?"
17
Lodowick Post was out with friends and hounds "upon a certain wild
and uninhabited, unpossessed and waste land" when he jumped "one of
those noxious beasts called a fox."i" Just as Post and his companions were
about to seize their quarry, Jesse Pierson stepped in, killed the fox, and
carried it off. When Pierson refused Post's demand for the carcass, 9 Post
sued out a writ of trespass on the case. The justice court held that Post was
indeed entitled to the fox. Pierson obtained a writ of ceitiorai to bring the
case to the New York Supreme Court, arguing that Post had no property in
the fox and thus no claim that he had been injured.20
Both parties agreed that ownership could only be acquired by
"occupancy"-that is, possession-but they differed on what occupancy
required. Pierson argued that physical possession was required;2 1 Post
countered that "[a]ny continued act" demonstrating "the intention of
exclusively appropriating that which was before in a state of nature" is
"equivalent to occupancy."22 The parties thus framed the issue before the
court as a choice between actual and constructive possession.
The majority sided with Pierson. Citing a long list of "ancient writers
upon general principles of law,"23 the court concluded that "actual bodily
seizure" or, at a minimum, "mortally wound[ing] or greatly maim[ing]" the
animal, was required because these give the pursuer the "certain control"
required for actual possession.2 4 Thus, "mere pursuit gave Post no legal right
to the fox, but.., he became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and
killed him."25 This conclusion was buttressed for the majority by the role
possession played in providing "certainty, and preserving peace and order in
society."
2 6
17 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. CFH. L. REV. 73, 73 (1985).
18 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. 175, 175 (N.Y. 1805). The waste land was Queens. On the relevance
of the pleading that the fox was a "noxious beast," see Geush v. Mlmns, (1614) 79 Eng. Rep. 274
(K.B.).
19 The fact that each of the parties spent more than $1,000 suggests that something more
than the carcass was at stake. See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 121 (indicating that it
was the fathers of Pierson and Post who insisted on the proceedings).
20 ierson, 3 Cai. at 175.
21 Id. at 176.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 177. The court cites Justinian, Fleta, Breton, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, Bynkershock,
and Grotius. Id. at 177-79.
24 Id at 178.
25 Id.
26 Id at 179. See also Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 560 (Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696) (holding
that usage allowing less than physical possession of a whale was justified on the grounds that,
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The dissent began with the proposition that examining the customs of
those actually engaged in the activity is preferable to "poring -over" the
writings of "Justinian, Fleta, Bracton, Pufendorf, Locke, Barbeyrac, or
Blackstone."27 Since there was no evidence of the customs of sportsmen,
Livingston (like a law-and-economics sage) contended that "our decision
should have in view the greatest possible encouragement to the destruction
of an animal, so cunning and ruthless in his career."2" He believed that
awarding the fox to the pursuer would achieve this objective.
The majority and dissent agree on the fundamental propositions:
possession is required for ownership and control is the key; it is the control
of nature that is the root of property. They also agree that property
allocation rules ought to serve utilitarian objectives. They differ only on the
degree of control required. The majority favors the unequivocal notice that
comes from the act of physical possession because it will reduce litigation
with its attendant social costs; the dissent prefers to reward the socially
useful labor of the hunters. Neither, however, addresses the more
fundamental question: why does possession create title?29
The "ancient writers," to whom both the majority and dissent refer,
offered two different answers to this question. Grotius and Pufendorf
advanced a consent theory: "it is to be supposed that all agreed, that
whatever each one had taken possession of should be his property."" Locke,
who thought the likelihood of consent was vanishingly small,3 countered
with a labor theory: when a person removes something from nature "he hath
mixed his Labourwith it... and thereby makes it his Property."32
"[ilf the pursuit of the Rainbow had been clearly understood in the beginning, no doubt the
other vessel would not have taken the trouble to join in it, and the usage would have had its
appropriate and beneficial effect"); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2-10 (stating that
possession gives notice of intent to appropriate).
27 Pierson, 3 Ca. at 180.
28 Id. "When we reflect also that the interest of our husbandmen, the most useful of men in
any community, will be advanced by the destruction of a beast so pernicious and incorrigible,
we cannot greatly err in saying that a pursuit like the present, through waste and unoccupied
lands, and which must inevitably and speedily have terminated in corporeal possession, or
bodily seisin, confers such a right to the object of it, as to make any one a wrong-doer who shall
interfere and shoulder the spoil." Id. at 182.
29 Other courts also struggled to define "possession" while ignoring the justification for
relying on possession. See, e.g., Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (whale); Swift v. Gifford,
23 F. Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696) (whale); Bartlett v. Budd, 2 F. Gas. 966 (D. Mass.
1868) (No. 1,075) (whale); Boume v. Ashley, 3 F. Gas. 1002 (D. Mass. 1863) (No. 1,698); Taber v.
Jenny, 23 F. Cas. 605 (D. Mass. 1856) (No. 13,720) (whale); Treat v. Parsons, 24 A. 946 (Me.
1892) (alewives); Brinckerhoff v. Starkins, 11 Barb. 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851) (oysters); Fleet v.
Hegeman, 14 Wend. 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (oysters); Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johns. 75 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1822) (deer); Rexroth v. Coon, 23 A. 37 (R.I. 1885) (bees).
30 HUGO GRoTius, DE JURE BELL Ac PACIs bk. II, ch. 2, U 5, 189-90 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
1925). The complete chain of title was from God to humanity-in-common to individuals through
consent. Id 1 1, 4-5, ch. 3, 1 1. For Pufendorfs perspective on the transition from common to
private property, see SAMUEL, BARON VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM bk. 4, ch. 6,
2 (Basil Kennett trans., 4th ed. London 1779) (1672).
31 "If such consent [of all humanity] was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the
Plenty God has given him." LOCKE, supra note 8, at 306; see also id at 307. In economic jargon,
the transaction costs would preclude the bargain.
32 Id. at306.
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Although echoes of Grotius and Locke might be heard in both the
majority and dissent, the law is (as we are often reminded) neither logic nor
philosophy, but rather a practical thing.' In their unexamined assumption
that possession is sufficient to establish title, the majority and dissent in
Pierson v. Post echo Blackstone, who thought that the dispute between
Grotius and Locke "savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement"; it
was sufficient, Blackstone concluded, "that both sides agree.., that
occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained."'
Beyond this, however, the court had no need to consult the "ancient
writers upon the general principles of law"3" because there was ample
precedent at common law. In 1592, for example, the King's Bench had
decided that a person could acquire property in wild animals per
industriam-that is, "by industry as by taking them [ie., capture], or by
making them mansueta [naturae, i.e., tamed]."36 The court also defined the
property that could be acquired in animals ferae naturae as "qualified": it is
possessory in the sense that it is lost if the animal escapes.3 7 Thus, arguably
at least, the majority got it right: Post's industry had yet to achieve control
over the animal.
The rule of capture envisions animals ferae naturae as (at least
potentially) the stuff of property. But wildlife is an uncommon sort of
property.3 In addition to being "qualified and possessory," as the King's
Bench noted, an animal ferae naturae is both alive and dependent for its
continued survival on the forbearance of humans, a forbearance that history
demonstrates is uncommon. Wildlife, as vagrant stuff subject to capture,
requires the tolerance of everyone who might kill it or destroy its habitat-
and much of the story of wildlife in America has been a recurring
demonstration of the tragedy embedded in the saga of Pierson, Post, and the
fox.
33 E.g, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881) ("The life of the common law has not been logic: it has been
experience."); see also Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358,
366 (1910) (Holmes, J.) ("Tradition and the habits of the community count for more than
logic.").
34 BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *8. Both theories do have their shortcomings. Consent
seems at best a just-so story and there is no intuitively obvious reason why labor itself should
create rights in things. See generally Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Mtle, 13 GA. L.
REV. 1221, 1221-22 (1979) (analyzing the common law and philosophical origins of the doctrine
of possession); Carol Rose, supra note 17, at 75 (exploring the confines of the doctrine of
possession).
35 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
36 The Case of Swans, (1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435, 438 (K.B.). The court's category is, of course,
descriptive rather than prescriptive as it was for Locke.
37 "Property qualified and possessory a man may have in those [animals] which are ferae
natuwae." Id
38 E.g, PAUL SHEPARD, THE OTHERS: How ANIMALS MADE US HUMAN 12 (1996) (arguing that
humans became human by defining themselves in opposition to other animals and that we will
cease to be human to the extent that the world lacks other animals).
2005]
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B. Capture as the Law of the Rush
America has been a rush from the beginning.3 9 There have been gold
rushes and timber rushes,a" rushes to grow cows 41 and to claim newly
opened lands. Nor are rushes solely historical: there now is a rush to capture
the insecticide intolerance of pests.42 By capturing and controlling a bit of
nature-grass or trees or animals-and converting it into dollars, natural
capital is transformed into personal income. When technology creates a
market for a previously unvalued piece of nature4 (as was the case with
39 See, e.g., BARRY LOPEZ, REDISCOVERY OF NORTH AMERICA 9 (1990) (describing how, since
the time of the earliest European explorers, the 'New World' has been the stage for "a ruthless
angry search for wealth").
40 Eg, WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 148-206
(1991) (describing how the allure of "free land" drove settlers to clear and cut vast swaths of
forest in return for generous economic rewards); MICHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEIR
FORESTS: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 197-237 (1989) (stating that the rush to cut the great forests
of the upper midwest had begun by the 1840s after eastern forests had been depleted); STEPHEN
A. DOUGLAS PUTER, LOOTERS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1908)17-21 (detailing the fraudulent means
by which the redwood forests of northern California were cut during the late 1800s); RICHARD
WHITE, LAND USE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1980) (describing the lumber boom in the
forests around Puget Sound).
41 See generally ROBERT G. ATHEARN, HIGH COUNTRY EMPIRE 127-75 (1960) (describing the
cattle ranching boom that occurred after the Civil War); CRONON, supra note 40, at 218-59
(1991) (discussing the rapid expansion of the cattle industry during the late 19th century);
EDWARD EVERETT DALE, THE RANGE CATTLE INDUSTRY 30-170 (1930) (referring to the end of the
Civil War, the removal of bison from the grasslands, and a surplus of Texas cattle as factors
leading to the expansion of the cattle industry); PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 466-68 (photo. reprint 1979) (1968) (discussing the conflicts that arose between
stockmen and settlers over access to public rangelands for cattle grazing in the 1880s); SAMUEL
P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 48-65 (1959) (describing the problems
associated with the cattle industry during the ranching boom of the late 19th century); G. WEIS,
STOCK RAISING IN THE NORTHWEST, 1884 at 20 (Herbert 0. Brayer trans., 1951) (discussing the
"rapid spread of immigration" and the "unequaled prosperity" of ranching in 1884); JAMES A.
YOUNG & B. ABBOTT SPARKS, CATTLE IN THE COLD DESERT (1985) (describing the factors that
shaped the ranching industry during the 1880s); George C. Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-
Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management I. The Commons and the Taylor Grazing
Act4 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (1982) ("From mid-century to 1891, it is estimated that the number of
cattle in Arizona alone rose from 50,000 to perhaps one and one-half million. Similar expansions
occurred in the other public land states.").
42 Consider the case of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) crops. Bt is a sol bacteria that has genes
that encode proteins that are toxic to certain classes of insects, including some significant
agricultural pests. Using recombinant DNA technology, seed companies have introduced these
genes into plants so that they produce the Bt toxins and thus are toxic to pests that consume
the plants. As a result, these crops are expected to sustain less insect damage and produce
higher yields. Although Bt susceptibility is the dominant trait, not all individuals in the pest
population are susceptible to Bt. If two resistant individuals mate, their offspring are likely to
also be resistant. Thus susceptibility is an open-access resource since planting Bt crops reduces
the pool of susceptible organisms and increases the likelihood that resistance will develop.
Adding the gene for Bt to crops significantly increases the risk of creating resistant insects since
the plants continuously manufacture the proteins, thus enhancing the selection for resistance in
the pest population. See Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and
Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297,302-10 (2002).
43 The conclusion that some piece of nature is a "resource" is a complex act of social
definition. Eugene Hunn provides an example: suckers are not resources for Euro-Americans in
the Pacific Northwest and agencies nominally acting under "multiple-use resource
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great auk feathers'), or allows mass marketing of the piece (as was the case
with passenger pigeons45 ), the rush is on. Legal historian James Willard
Hurst thought that rushes characterized nineteenth-century Americans,
whom, he concluded, "had in common a deep faith in the social benefits to
flow from a rapid increase in productivity; all shared an impatience to get on
management" systematically extirpate suckers from trout streams. Eugene S. Hunn, Mobility as
a Factor Limiting Resource Use in the Columbia Plateau of North America, in NORTHWEST
LANDS, NORTHWEST PEOPLES 156, 161 (Dale D. Goble & Paul W. Hirt eds., 1999). Suckers are,
however, highly valued resources for Indians of the region. Id Cronon's study of New England
demonstrates how the Indians and the English perceived the same habitat in dramatically
different ways. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND viii (1983) (attributing many
ecological changes in New England to the colonists' more exclusive sense of property in land).
On the more general question of how societies create "natural resources" by valuing certain
elements of their habitat, see WALTER FIREY, MAN, MIND AND LAND 27-28 (1960) (describing how
culture informs societies' perceptions of available resources through examples detailing how
similar resources have been used and viewed differently by different cultures); Alexander
Spoehr, Cultural Differences in the Interpretation of Natural Resources, in MAN'S ROLE IN
CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH 93 (William L. Thomas, Jr. ed., 1956) (interpreting natural
resources in relation to technology, social structure, and the interpretation of habitat); Carolyn
Merchant, The Theoretical Structure of Ecoiogical Revolutions 11 ENVTL. REV. 265 (1987)
(discussing how society interacts with the environment); and Donald Worster, Transformations
of the Earth: Toward an Agroecologieal Perspective in History, 76 J. AM. HIST. 1087 (1990)
(describing how societies determine what is a resource).
44 The great auk-Pinguinus impenns--was the original penguin. It was a flightless bird of
the North Atlantic that stood two and a half feet tall and weighed eleven pounds. The species
bred in large colonies on offshore islands. Fishers routinely stopped at nesting colonies such as
that on Funk Island off Newfoundland's east coast for fresh meat. Eg., HAROLD A. INNIS, THE
COD FISHERIES 26 n.53 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1954) (1940) (quoting 1 VOYAGES OF THE ENGLISH
NATION TO AMERICA BEFORE THE YEAR 1600 at 303, 334 (Edmund Goldsmid ed., 1889)). After
about 1770, however, the birds were also systematically slaughtered for their feathers, which
were used to stuff mattresses. In 1785, George Cartwright noted that "it has been customary of
late years, for several crews of men to live all summer on [Funk] island, for the sole purpose of
killings birds for the sake of their feathers, the destruction which they have made is incredible.
If a stop is not soon put to that practice, the whole breed will be diminished to almost
nothing...." David N. Nettleship & Peter G.H. Evans, Distribution and Status of the Atlantic
Alcidae, in THE ATLANTIC ALCIDAE 53, 68 (David N. Nettleship & Tim R. Birkhead eds., 1985)
(quoting 3 GEORGE CARTWRIGHT, JOURNAL OF TRANSACTIONS AND EVENTS, DURING A RESIDENCE OF
NEARLY SLXTEEN YEARS ON THE COAST OF LABRADOR 55 (Newark, England, Allin & Ridge 1792).
45 Although commercial marketing of pigeons became a major industry after 1840, it was
not until after the Civil War that the nineteenth century's most advanced technology-railroads
and telegraphs-was available in the service of the pigeon netters. The use of the railroad-with
its rapid transportation-and the refrigerator car-which prevented spoilage-opened markets
in eastern cities. See A.W. SCHORGER, THE PASSENGER PIGEON 144 (1955) (linking the rise in
pigeon trading with the increased availability of rapid rail service to large eastern city centers).
Cf CRONON, supra note 40, at 55-93 (discussing how the development of rail transportation
allowed Chicago to become the stockyard of the east coast); id. at 234 (noting that the
refrigerated railroad car first introduced by Swift in the late 1870s); Etta S. Wilson, Personal
Recollections of the Passenger Pigeon, 51 AUK 157, 163 (1934) (explaining that before there
were railroads, birds were shipped by boat to Chicago). The telegraph allowed netters to track
the locations of nestings. SCHORGER, supra at 146. The tonnage of birds shipped to market is as
staggering as the reports of their migratory flights: from an 1869 nesting in Michigan more than
7,500,000 pigeons were shipped; in 1874, 40-50 tons of squabs-unfledged nestlings---were
shipped from Newaygo County, Michigan and another 1,075,000 pigeons were shipped to
market from nearby Shelby. Id. at 144-56.
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with the job by whatever means seemed functionally adapted to it, including
the law. "
46
The slaughter of the buffalo herds exemplifies this impatience. As one
contemporary observer commented, the rush to kill buffalo "was only
surpassed by the rush to the gold mines of California in earlier years."47 It
did produce near-instant wealth for some,48 but, as with other rushes, the
waste was often staggering. One witness, Colonel Richard Dodge, noted,
"[b]uffalo were slaughtered without sense or discretion, and oftentimes left
to rot with the hides on."49 Dodge estimated that each hide sent to market in
1872 represented three to five dead buffalo. 5°
Buffalo are only one example of the nineteenth century wildlife rushes.
Beaver were trapped out across the continent,5 1 the sea otter was extirpated
46 HURST, supra note 7, at 7. For a contemporary account of this belief, see 2 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36-49 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage pb. ed. 1945) (1840).
47 WILIAM T. HORNADAY, THE EXTERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN BISON 493 (E. Anne Bolen
ed., Smithsonian Inst. Press 2002) (1887). For a description of the rush, see FRANCIS HAINES, THE
BUFFALO 190-91 (1970).
48 For example, one hunter reportedly made $10,000 in a single season. E. DOUGLAS BRANCH,
THE HUNTING OF THE BUFFALO 200 (1929). A single hide was worth a week's wages for a laborer.
HAINES, supra note 47, at 190-91.
49 RICHARD I. DODGE, THE GREAT PLAINS AND THEIR INHABITANTS BEING A DESCRIPTION OF THE
PLAINS, GAME, INDIANS, ETC. OF THE GREAT NORTH AMERICAN DESERT 134 (New York, G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1877)
60 Id. at 131-32. As the skill of the workers increased and the buffalo became scarcer, the
waste decreased. In 1873, the figure was one robe for two dead buffalo and by 1874, Dodge
estimated that 100 robes were shipped for every 125 buffalo killed. Id. at 141-42.
51 4 ERNEST T. SETON, LIVES OF GAME ANMALS 451 (1937) (noting "nearly complete"
extinction of beaver in the US and cataloguing attempts to restock over trapped areas).
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throughout most of its range, 2 and sea minIk5 and passenger pigeons' were
driven to extinction.
52 The historic range of the sea otter was from the northern Japanese archipelago through
the Aleutian Islands and along the North American coast as far south as Morro Hermoso in Baja
California. See generally ADELE OGDEN, THE CALIFORNIA SEA OTTER TRADE, 1784-1848 (1941)
(collecting early American and Mexican public and private documents to highlight the impact of
early Pacific maritime trade on southern otter populations from Japan to California); 2 PAUL C.
PHILLIPS & J.W. SMURR, THE FUR TRADE 39-42 (1961) (linking England's near obsession with sea
otter pelts to Captain Cook's exploration of the Northwest coast of America and noting that
expeditions were more motivated by pelt commerce than exploration). Initially, pelts were
purchased from Northwest Coast Indian nations at Nootka Sound on the west coast of
Vancouver Island. As otter populations along the northwest coast dropped, some traders
shipped Aleuts rented from the Russians in Alaska to harvest pelts along the California coast.
Sea otters along the Pacific coast had been largely exterminated by 1L24-1825. Id at 57. More
than 107,000 sea otter pelts were sold in China between 1804 and 1813, but the number of pelts
declined steadily and amounted to only 300 skins by 1824-1825. Id As the ever-less plentiful
animals became increasingly difficult to find, the trade was abandoned and relict populations of
the animal gradually recolonized much of its former range. This led to a second round of
hunting. Between 1881 and 1890 more than 47,000 were taken. Again, however, exploitation led
to a precipitous decline: by 1900, only 127 pelts were taken. PETER MATIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN
AMERICA 105 (1964). By 1911, otters had been eliminated except for small remnant populations
in Alaska and on the central California coast. James A. Estes et al., Sea Otter Predation and
Community Organization in the Western Aleutian Islands, Alaska, 59 ECOLOGY 822, 822 (1978).
53 The sea mink was extirpated for its pelt. See generally ALFRED J. GODIN, WILD MAMMALS
OF NEW ENGLAND 230 (1977) (profiling the sea mink); 2 E. RAYMOND HALL, THE MAMMALS OF
NORTH AMERICA 1002, 1004 (2d ed. 1981) (providing habitat and scientific information); PETER
MATrHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 85 (1964) (noting price of sea mink pelts). Before the
European invasion, the species apparently inhabited the Atlantic coast from Nova Scotia to
Connecticut. Because of their size-about twice that of the inland species-their skins
commanded high prices. As one fur buyer who purchased some 50,000 sea mink pelts wrote,
because of their price "they were persistently hunted.... As the price of mink rose, they were
hunted more and grew scarcer, till the [eighteen] sixties, when mink skins brought eight to ten
dollars apiece, parties who made a business of hunting nearly or quite exterminated the race."
Manly Hardy, The Extinct Mink from the Maine Shell Heaps, 61 FOREST & STREAM 125 (1903).
54 Pigeons were tasty. 2 PETER KALM'S TRAVELS IN NORTH AMERICA 369 (Adolph B. Benson
ed., John Reinhold Forster trans., Wilson-Erickson Inc. 1937) (1770). They were also used as
live predecessors of today's clay pigeons. SCHORGER, supra note 45, 157-66. Their gregarious
habits made them easy to kill: reports of killing a dozen or more with one shot-gun blast are
common and they were netted by the thousands. Id at 167-98; I.L. Brisbin, The Passenger
Pigeon: A Study in the Ecology of Extinction, MODERN GAME BREEDING, Oct. 1968, at 13, 15-16;
Pehr Kalm, A Description of the Wild Pigeons which Visit the Southern English Colonies in
North America, During Certain Years, in Incredible Multitudes, 28 AUK 53, 66 (1911) (translation
of original report in 20 KONGL. VETENSKAPS-AKADEMIENS HANDLIGAR (1759)) (reporting more
than 100 birds killed with a single discharge); Wilson, supra note 45, at 160-61 (describing the
insatiable appetite for pigeon by relating that in one day in 1855, the Fulton Market in
Milwaukee received over 18,000 pigeons). As long as hunting was restricted to subsistence
needs, the pigeon population withstood the pressure-it could not, however, withstand market
demand. See SCHORGER, supra note 45, at 137-38 (describing Native American harvesting
methods); David E. Blockstein & Harrison B. Tordoff, A Contemporary Look at the Extinction
of the Passenger Pigeon, 39 AM. BIRDS 845, 849 (1985) (stating that at its heydey the pigeon
market employed 1000 pigeoners who supplied birds by rail to the big city markets in the east
and midwest and noting that one colony in Michigan produced 200,000 birds in one year); see
also JENNIFER PRICE, Missed Connections: The Passenger Pigeon Extinction, in FLIGHT MAPS
1-56 (1999) (chronicling the decline of pigeons, which numbered in the billions in the 1870s and
only the dozens by the 1890s).
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The law that reflected and reinforced this perspective-the law of the
rush-is the law of Pierson v. Post. In the words of Stephen J. Field, the
California mining-camp attorney who became a United States Supreme
Court Justice:
The wild bird in the air belongs to no one, but when the fowler brings it to the
earth and takes it into his possession it is his property. He has reduced it to his
control by his own labor, and the law of nature and the law of society recognize
his exclusive right to it .... So the trapper on the plains and the hunter in the
north have a property in the furs they have gathered, though the animals from
which they were taken roamed at large and belonged to no one.... "So the
miners, on the public lands throughout the Pacific States and Territories, by
their customs, usages, and regulations, everywhere recognized the inherent
justice of this principle .... 55
The moral of the tale was not lost on gold miners or pigeon hunters or
salmon fishers: the law rewarded individual initiative; the prize went to he
who seized it." When first in time is first in right, speed is all. The result was
55 Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 374 (Field, J., dissenting) (1884)
(quoting Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507, 512 (1874) (Field, J.)). See generally Dale
D. Goble, PriorAppropriation and the Property Clause: A Dialogue ofAccommodation, 71 OR. L.
REV. 381 (1992) (exploring the link between western water laws and national jurisprudence).
Despite Justice Field's grandiloquent mythology, both the gold in California and the "wild
bird in the air" belonged to someone. The failure of Congress to decide upon a policy for the
gold fields did not transform the trespassers into owners, as Justice Field had recognized in his
earlier role as a justice on the California Supreme Court:
It is sometimes said, in speaking of the public lands, that there is a general license
from the United States to work the mines which these lands contain. But this language,
though it has found its way into some judicial decisions, is inaccurate, as applied to the
action, or, rather, want of action, of the government. There is no license in the legal
meaning of that term. A license... implies a permission .... It carries an interest in the
land, and arises only from grant. The mineral. is under the exclusive control of
Congress, equally with any other interest the government possesses in land. But
Congress has adopted no specific action on the subject, and has left that matter to be
controlled by its previous general legislation respecting the public domain. And it is from
its want of specific action, from its passiveness, that the inference is drawn of a general
license. The most which can be said is, that the government has forborne to exercise its
rights, but this forbearance confers no positive right ....
It may be, and undoubtedly is, a very convenient rule, in determining controversies
between parties on the public lands, where neither can have absolute rights, to presume
a grant, from the government, of mines, water-privileges, and the like, to the first
appropriator; but such a presumption can have no place for consideration against the
superior proprietor.
Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 374-75 (1859) (Fields, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Mining Co. v. Boggs, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 304, 309 (1865) (noting that the only possible
basis for jurisdiction is the allegation of prior possession, "[b]ut this allegation does not set up
any authority exercised under the United States in taking such possession"); see also Mallett v.
Uncle Sam Gold & Silver Mining Co., 1 Nev. 188, 202 (1865); Gold Hill Quartz Mining Co. v. Ish, 5
Or. 104, 106 (1873). It was-and still is-illegal to occupy federal lands until "duly authorized by
law." Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 46, § 1, 2 Stat. 445, 445.
56 It is in this sense that capture-like Locke's labor theory-rests upon "desert," which in
turn accounts for much of its appeal. E.g, LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL
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often profligate waste: buffalo rotted on the high plains and pigeons were
left where they fell when picking them up became too onerous.-7
This is, of course, what has come to be known as the "Tragedy of the
Commons," the idea that individuals acting with rational self-interest
produce tragedy for the group.5" But the title is misleading, like the
magician's waving hand that directs attention away from the doing of the
deed. In fact, common property is often an ecologically coherent response to
seasonal resource variation such as an anadromous fishery.5" Indeed, the
history of common property in the absence of a market economy is one of
long-term management.60 A more apt phrase might be "Tragedy of the
Market," since the problem arises from the conjunction of the market-driven
goal of capturing a saleable surplus, and an open-access or common-pool
regime in which anyone can capture.61 It is at the latter point that Pierson v.
Post becomes relevant: when animals ferae naturae are a thing-owned-by-no-
one (res nufllus), and property is based on capture and possession, the drive
for marketable surplus produces tragedy-and the rule of capture
necessarily presumes a thing-owned-by-no-one, otherwise it would be
theft.62
FOUNDATIONS 49 (1977).
57 "Of the countless thousands of birds bruised, broken and fallen, a comparatively few
could be salvaged yet wagon loads were being driven out in an almost unbroken procession,
leaving the ground covered with the living, dying, dead and rotting bids. An inferno where the
Pigeons had builded their Eden." Wilson, supra note 45 at 166. Similarly, James Fenimore
Cooper has Leatherstocking issue a Biblical denunciation on the wasteful slaughter of pigeons.
JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, The Pioneers, or the Sources of the Susquehanna, 1 THE
LEATHERSTOCKING TALES 246-50 (Library of America ed. 1985) (1823).
58 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
59 For example, in his examination of the interaction between New England's indigenous
peoples and the European invaders, William Cronon has demonstrated that common property
arrangements allowed cyclical use of seasonal resources. Cronon concludes that it was the
English conception of property as alienable things to be traded in a marketplace that led to their
overuse. See generally CRONON, supra note 43; see also MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE
ECONOMICS 1-39 (1972) (analyzing the approach of hunter gatherer societies toward
possessions and provisions in a state of plenty).
60 See, e.g., S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in
Natural Resources PoKcy 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 718-19 (1975) (discussing the strategies
used by various societies to manage common property); Robert Netting, Of Men and Meadows:
Strategies for Alpine Land Use, 45 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 132 (1972) (detailing the success of
Swiss mountain communities in managing scarce, common-property resources).
61 See, e.g., Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 60, at 718-19 (noting that the exposure of
communal management to outside market forces results in the depletion of the resource
because the market forces are outside communal management, and because of communal
management's "inherent weakness" in adapting to contact with the market); Arthur F. McEvoy,
Toward an Interactive Theory of Nature and Culture: Ecologv, Production, and CogTdtion in the
California Fishing Industry, in THE ENDS OF THE EARTH 211 (Donald Worster ed., 1988)
(suggesting that "the tragic tale" of the commons which portrays people as "profit-maximizing
automatons" may "serve less well as a heuristic device for understanding environmental
problems than as a recipe for exacerbating them"); Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics
of Property Rights and Conunon Pool Resources, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 633 (1992) (examining
various criticisms of traditional notions of the tragedy of the commons).
62 But recall the words of the English nursery rhyme:
They hang the man and flog the woman
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III. ARNOLD v MUNDY" LIMITING CAPTURE
The "ancient writers" that the court cited in Pierson v. Post began with
the proposition that animals ferae naturae were res nullius. Justinian's
discussion of how "things become property of individuals," for example,
begins with the example of "wild animals, birds and fish, ie., all animals
born on land or in the sea or air, [which] as soon as they are caught by
anyone, forthwith fall into his ownership by the law of nations: for what
previously belonged to no one is, by natural reason, accorded to its
captor."' The Enlightenment civilians followed Justinian, and treated
animals ferae naturae as the paradigm of an unowned thing. Indeed, it was
as property that wildlife excited the imagination of the "ancient writers" that
was the focus of the discussion in Pierson v. Post. For jurists such as Hugo
Grotius 4 and Samuel, Baron von Pufendorf,65 wild animals were one of the
few remaining examples of unowned stuff.
At the common law, however, the record is more complicated.
A. Before Mundy: The King's Prerogative and Wildlife
The colonies' rebellion against England necessitated a fundamental
transformation in American political thought. "For most Americans," as
Gordon Wood has written, "the deeply felt meaning of the Revolution [was]:
they had created a new world, a republican world."66 But this new world did
not spring ready-made, it required re-understanding the roots of political
power. At the time of the Revolution, political actions were legitimate to the
extent that they were taken under the sanction of the king and illegal to the
extent that they were not because sovereignty was located in the king. With
the revolution, sovereignty had to be relocated.67
This relocation is relevant to this twice-told tale because it is central to
the historical evolution of the concept of "prerogative." To understand this
evolution and its current residue, it is helpful to locate it in the transition
that occurred around the turn of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth
century-a transition from property to sovereignty, on one hand, and from
That steal the goose from off the common,
But let the greater villain loose
That steals the common from the goose.
Quoted in David Bollier, Reclaiming the Commons, BOSTON REV. (Summer 2002) available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.3/bolier.html.
63 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. II, tit. 1, §§ 11-12 (J.A.C. Thomas trans., 1975) (533); see
also GMUS, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIuS, FIRST COMMENTARY: CONCERNING FIDUCIARY GUARDIANSHIP,
in 1 THE CIVIL LAw § 66 (S.P. Scott ed., 1932) ("we become owners of [property] because it
previously belonged to no one else; and in this class are included all animals which are taken in
land or in water or in air").
64 GROTIUS, supra note 30, at bk. II, ch. 8, § 2.
65 PUFENDORF, supra note 30, at bk. 4, ch. 6, § 4.
66 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC, 1776-1787, at 47 (1969).
67 See JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS 14-34 (1987) (discussing the source
of the king's authority, his loss of legitimacy leading up to the revolution, and ultimately
Congress's adoption of the king's lost legitimacy).
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property to contract, on another. To understand these shifts, it is helpful to
take one step back, to the transition from personal to proprietary-to a
period when the current terms are nonexistent or, at least, inapt.
1. 17rom Personal to Proprietary
The English common law evolved out of the customs of largely
autonomous agricultural communities bound to the seasonal rounds of
planting and harvesting at a time when change was nearly nonexistent.68 In
such a universe, custom is a guide to how things should be done and, as
such, the first step to law.
Providing for the material needs of this society produced sophisticated
arrangements for distributing and managing natural resources. The actions
and claims of different community members intertwined to create complex
patterns of resource use on the land: After some community members
harvested crops from individual plots, others grazed cattle in fields so that
their dung fertilized the soil; the grass and acorns in a copse of trees
provided forage for cattle and pigs during another part of the seasonal cycle;
community members used wood from those trees for fuel or building; they
netted fish and hunted wildlife. The patterns were complex, but spatially
limited and centered on subsistence.
The Norman Conquest in 1066 overlaid these resource allocation
patterns with a feudal economic and social system-a hierarchical series of
relationships in which subservient persons held land under a personal
relationship to a lord in return for an obligation of service to that lord. This
mix of Anglo-Saxon and feudal ideas became the tenurial system that
evolved into the common law of property.
The feudal structure also strengthened centralizing forces already at
work. For this twice-told tale, it is the king's courts, and the common law
that those courts created, that produced the most important changes.
Although these courts began primarily as a source of revenue and as a
means of clarifying the rights and duties in feudal land tenures, in time the
judiciary became a powerful mechanism for asserting royal/national
authority.
This transition in perspective-from local to national-created pressure
to regularize the nomenclature and content of land-use rights. The resource
allocation and management patterns abstracted from local manors and
villages slowly were transformed into property. "The man of the thirteenth
century does not say, 'I agree that you may have so many trees out of my
copse in every year,' he says, 'I give and grant you so much wood."'69 That is,
he created what we would now define as a proprietary relationship. Thus,
68 See generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 11-20 (2d ed.
1979) (chronicling the emergence of the common law from "institutions which existed in an
undeveloped state before 1066"); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
11-12 (2d ed. 1981) (describing how the common law developed from laws and institutions that
were local and faced "needs of society [that] were diverse but unchanging").
69 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, at 146 (2d ed. 1968).
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the customary rotational grazing system became a "right of common in
pasture"; the right to feed pigs on acorns became a "right of pannage"; the
custom of taking wood became "estovers"; the customary fishing hole
became a "common piscary."7° Custom was transformed into a series of
"incorporeal hereditaments"-inheritable, intangible property such as profits
a' prendre. As Bracton wrote near the end of the thirteenth century, "[a]
servitude may be constituted in many ways, as that one have the right to
pasture in another's property, or the right to cultivate it, to go over it, to
draw water from it, to fish in it, to conduct water over it, to hunt on it, and
there may be an infinite number of other rights."
71
This evolutionary process was both untidy and convoluted. In part, this
reflected the conjunction of proprietary rights and governmental powers.
What we now conceive as "sovereignty"-govenmmental and regulatory
power-generally began as property-like tenures. The lord of the manor, for
example, was the chief landholder, the head of the local government, and the
representative of the distant king. The king himself was, after all, only a
manorial lord writ large; and the "kingly power ... a mode of dominium; the
ownership of a chattel."7 2 One of the great themes of medieval English legal
history, the English legal historian Frederic Maitland has noted, is the
"struggle of ownership and rulership to free themselves from each other."73
In such a system, the power to hold court or to hang a criminal was based on
personal relations between ruler and ruled, relationships that were slowly
being transformed into property.
In wildlife law, for example, the power to regulate taking of wildlife or
habitat modification has one of its founts in the prerogative of the English
kings to declare land to be a "forest," an area where the king had a right to
hunt the "beasts of the forest" such as the king's deer.74 In such a universe,
70 See generally 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 355-57 (3d ed. 1923)
(discussing the law of incorporeal things at the time of the reign of Edward I); 3 id at 137-51 (3d
ed. 1923) (continuing the discussion of the law of incorporeal things during the late medieval
period); 7 id at 31242 (1926) (tracing the subject through the end of the nineteenth century);
MiISOM, supra note 68, 21, 101-02 (discussing changes in the law of incorporeal rights).
71 3 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 166 (Samuel Thorne trans.,
1997). Henry of Bratton (Henricus de Brattona) (c. 1210-1268) was a judge on the coram rege
(later the King's Bench) from 1247-1250 and 1253-1257. He is remembered for De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae--On the Laws and Customs of England-a broad, philosophical
treatise often called the most important work on English law before Blackstone. The book-
conmmonly known as "Bracton-attempts to rationalize English common law in terms of the
combination of Roman and canon law that was taught in the universities of the period.
BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND is available online at http://hlsl.law.harvard.
edu/bracton/C ommor/index.htm.
72 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 69, at 513.
73 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 30 (Cambridge 1897). Over time, as
sovereignty and property came to be perceived as different things, the king's powers slowly
declined. The story is summarized in Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of
Property Predicted from Its Past 22 NoMos 28, 34-47 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1980).
More detail on the early period, in which vassals in Norman England began to acquire
identifiable property rights, is provided in Robert C. Palmer, The Onzgis of Property in England,
3 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1985), and Robert C. Palmer, The Economic and Cultural Impacts of the
Orgins of Property: 1180-1220,3 LAw & HIST. REv. 375 (1985).
74 Following the Norman Conquest, William the Conqueror arrogated to himself the
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the right to hunt was property-like. In trying to rationalize this untidy,
ongoing evolution of the common law, Bracton concluded that the king was
the "owner" of animals ferae naturae. "wild beasts, birds and fish... are...
prerogative power to designate tracts of land as "forests." Edward Coke gave a concise
definition of the term: "A Forest doth consist of eight things, videlicet of soil, covert, laws,
courts, judges, officers, game, and certain bounds." EDWARD COKE, FOURTH PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288 (Hargrave & Butler eds., 1st Am. ed. 1853) (1628); see
also JOHN MANWOOD, A TREATISE AND DISCOURSE OF THE LAWES OF THE FOREST ch. i, § 1 (Garland
Publ'g 1978) (1598). The forest law was, in the traditional phrase, intended to protect "the vert
and Venison." The vert-the green plants--was protected by restricting the uses of lands within
the forest; it was protected to preserve the "venison"-specified species of wildlife ("game"):
the "five wild beasts of venerie, that are called beasts of Forest... the Hart; the Hynde, the
Hare, the Boare, and the Woffe." Id at ch. iv, § 1. To protect the vert and venison, there was an
administrative and law enforcement system staffed with unique officers-justices, wardens,
verderers, gamekeepers, woodwards, agisters, and regarders-who acted under a distinct body
of law in a series of prerogative courts-the courts of Swanimote, Attachment, Regard, the
General and Special Inquisitions, and the Eyre. Although the king had the power-the
prerogative-to create the forest and, indeed, was seised of the fores4 he was not necessarily
seised of all of the lands within the forest because individuals could hold land within forests. Id.
at ch. iii, § 4. The ability of such inholders to fully exploit their land was, however, restricted by
its location within the forest. The crucial point is that a "forest" was a legal classification of land
rather than a physical description of that land: a forest might include villages and cultivated
fields as well as tracts of trees and brush. In more modem terminology, a forest was a land-use
classification. As Manwood put it, "by the lawes of the Forest, no man may cut downe his
woods, nor destroy any coverts, within the Forest, without the view of the Forester, and license
of the Lord Chief Justice in Eyre of the Forest, although that the soile, wherein those woods do
grow, be a mans owne freehold." Id. at ch. viii, § 2. The punishment for impermissibly intruding
upon the forest was amercement (fine) at the next Eyre in addition to an annual fine based on
the crops sown: For every acre illegally planted, the fine was a shilling for winter corn (either
wheat or rye) and sixpence for spring corn (generally oats). The tenant was allowed to
remain-subject to the continuing payment of the fine at subsequent regards. See id at ch. viii,
§ 5. Thus the administrative system effectively converted fines into a source of permanent,
annual rent. While the hunt was the origin of the forest, the institution quickly acquired a
financial component that often overshadowed the desire to prevent the destruction of habitat.
See generally E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 28-32 (1975) (discussing the management of
Windsor Forest for deer). See also RICHARD, FITZ NIGEL, DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO [THE COURSE OF
THE EXCHEQUER] bk. I, ch. xI-xu (Charles Johnson ed. & trans., 1983) (1176) (discussing the
"King's Forest"); G.J. Turner, Introduction to SELECT PLEAS OF THE FOREST ix-xiv (G.J. Turner
ed. & trans., 1901) (discussing beasts of the forest).
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W [Vol. 35:807
the property of the prince by the jus gentium [je., civil law]." 75 Bracton was
not alone.
2. Royal Animals and Royal Rivers
In 1592, Queen Elizabeth claimed ownership of some 500 unmarked
swans7" in Dorset County and directed her sheriff to seize them. 77 Lady Joan
Young and Thomas Saunger, knight, disputed the Queen's claim, asserting
title to the swans through prescription.' When the case reached the King's
75 2 BRACTON, supra note 71, at 41. Although Bracton generally followed Roman law, in his
assertion that the king owned animals ferae naturae he departed from that law. See, e.g., THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. II, tit. 1, §§ 12-13, 15 (J.A.C. Thomas trans., 1975) (533) (noting that
animals ferae naturae were res nullius). His position has been described as
an extreme statement of the view that beasts of the chase ought to belong to the king
unless the privilege of hunting them had been conceded to subjects by a Royal grant. The
law of the Forest was derived from such a view and although it ran counter to old usage
it found strong support among partizans of Royal power.
Sir Paul Vinogradoff, The Roman Elements in Bracton's Treatise, 32 YALE L.J. 751, 754-55
(1923). Cf 7 WIILIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw 491 (1925).
[T]here is no reason to think that [the idea that all wild animals were the property of the
crown] was ever the law of England. The king may, it is true, have claimed to be the
owner of all wild animals, just as he may have claimed to be the owner of all mines; but
just as his claims over mines came to be limited to mines of a special kind, so his claims
to wild animals came to be limited to a few varieties, such as swans and whales; and,
even in these cases, his rights were subject to all sorts of qualifications and limitations.
Id.
76 Swans are "marked" by notching their bills and the webbing of their feet. Marking serves
the same purpose as branding livestock. There is a royal officer-the Master of the King's (or
Queen's) Game of Swans (the magister deductus cignorum)-who is responsible for the care of
the royal swans as well as the general supervision of swan-keeping in England. This involves
several tasks including supervising the annual "upping," the round-up of the year's new broods
of cygnets and their marking with the parents' swan-marks. This was a process not unlike the
annual fall round-up and branding of range cattle. See NORMAN F. TICEHURST, THE MUTE SWAN IN
ENGLAND 54-72 (1957) (stating that cygnets are captured with their parents, the parents' swan-
marks checked, and the cygnets marked).
77 The Case of Swans, (1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435, 436 (K.B.).
78 "Prescription" is the assertion of a right to the enjoyment of something based on
immemorial use and enjoyment. It was a means for people to prove their ownership of a thing
when they lacked a piece of writing to evidence that ownership. In medieval England, most
people could neither read nor write; documents were not commonly created and were easily
lost or destroyed. For centuries, even transfers of land could take place by means of a
ceremony that included no written instrument of transfer. Thus, many owners whose rights
began by express grant, oral or written, had to rely on prescription to prove their rights. The
essential element of proof was the unbroken possession and use of a thing so long as anyone
could remember (that is, for such period as "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary").
In Bracton's words, incorporeal rights may be acquired "if one uses for some time, peacefully
and without interruption, neither by force nor stealth nor at will. . . ." 3 BRACTON, supra note 71,
at 163 [bk. 4, ch. 37, f. 222a]. A more recent discussion of the concept notes
The true foundation of these incorporeal interests is long continued occupation and
enjoyment, under circumstances implying acquiescence on the part of those, who have
other interests, which conflict either directly or by consequence with the newly assumed
right.... [T]he foundation of prescription is the necessity of upholding an interest, which
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Bench, the judges offered a detailed classification system of the ways in
which animals ferae naturae could be "property."7" For this tale, the crucial
decision was that "all white swans not marked, which having gained their
natural liberty, and are swimming in an open and common river, night be
seised to the King's use by his prerogative, because... a swan is a Royal
fowl; and all those, the property whereof is not known, do belong to the King
by his prerogative. and so... whales and sturgeons are Royal fish, and
belong to the King by his prerogative."80
Five years later, Justice Walmsley extended the Case ofSwans to apply
to all animals ferae naturae. That case, Bowiston v. Hardy," involved a
coney warren. 2 The defendant had brought the conies onto his land under a
has been exercised as if enjoyed under an actual grant, from the policy of sustaining
rather than destroying rights.
Acquisition of T'tle by Prescription, 19 Am. JuRisT 96, 100-101 (1838).
79 The court began by distinguishing between domesticated (domitae naturae) and wild
animals (ferae naturae): a person may have "absolute" property in domesticated animals, but
only a "qualified" property in wild animals, ie., a right that is possessory in the sense that the
right ends if the animal escapes from possession. 77 Eng. Rep. at 438. This qualified, possessory
property right in wild animals may arise in two ways:
(a) per industriam, that is, "by industry as by taking them [ie., by capture], or by making
them mansueta [naturae, ie., tamed]." Id If the animal is killed, the property in its carcass
becomes absolute since it can no longer escape.
(b) ratione impotentiae et loc, that is, when the animal is powerless to leave "by reason
of inability and place," i.e., "as if a man has young shovelers [a species of duck] or goshawks, or
the like, which are ferae naturae, and they build in my land, I have possessory property in them,
for if one takes them when they cannot fly, the owner of the soil shall have an action of
trespass.... ." Id. The Latin tag for this category was eventually shortened to "ratione loci," i.e.,
by reason of location, and sometimes restated as ratione solB i.e., by reason of [ownership] of
the soi! This category thus was a recognition that the owner of land had a right to exclude
others that implied a possessory interest resulting simply from the animal's presence on her
land.
80 Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
81 (1597) 78 Eng. Rep. 794 (KB.).
82 "Coney" (which rhymes with "honey") is the now-obsolete term for adult rabbits. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines "coney" as "[a] rabbit: formerly the proper and ordinary
name but now superseded in general use by rabbit, which was originally the name for the young
only." 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 955 (1971).
A "warren" was one of the hunting franchises that the king could grant. In Case of Swans,
the court also discussed a third category of property in animals: rationeprivlegit The owner of
a park or warren had a franchise or "privilege" to take game within the confines of the park or
warren, ie., "he hath not any property in the deer, or conies, or pheasants, or partridges... but
they do belong to him ratione priv egil for his game and pleasure, so long as they remain in
the privileged place." 77 Eng. Rep. at 438. This type of possessory interest was a result of a grant
by the king and differed from the possessory property right that the average landowner held.
See Sutton v. Moody, (1698) 91 Eng. Rep. 1063 (KB.) (discussing ownership rights in wild
animals acquired through ownership of a franchise). Blackstone provided the following
discussion of the hunting franchises:
As to a foresA this, in the hands of a subject, is properly the same thing as a chase:
being subject to the common law, and not to the forest laws. But a chase differs from a
park, in that it is not enclosed, and also in that a man may have a chase in another man's
ground as well as in his own, being indeed the liberty of keeping beasts of chase or royal
game therein, protected even from the owner of the land with a power of hunting them
thereon. A park is an enclosed chase, extending only over a man's own grounds. The
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grant from the Queen.8 3 The conies had increased in number to the point
that they were damaging the plaintiffs adjacent land. The court held that the
action would not lie, "for although one hath conies in his land, he hath not
any property in them, because they are ferae naturae."83 As Walmsley noted,
because the conies were ferae naturae, no one could own them except "by
grant from the King, or by prescription. .. for the Queen hath the royalty in
such things whereof none can have any property.""5
When James I succeeded Elizabeth on the throne in 1603, he granted Sir
Randall Mac Donnell a tract of land on the River Banne in Ireland.86 Mac
Donnell subsequently petitioned to be put into possession of the salmon
fishery in the river. When his petition was denied, he brought the action to
the King's Bench. The court also rejected his claim:
[t]here are two kinds of rivers; navigable and not navigable. Every navigable
river, so high as the sea flows and ebbs in it, is a royal river, and the fishery of it
is a royal fishery, and belongs to the king by his prerogative ... The reason for
which the king hath an interest in such navigable river, so high as the sea flows
and ebbs in it, is, because such river participates of the nature of the sea,...
and the sea is not only under the dominion of the king... but it is also his
proper inheritance; .... Also the king shall have the grand fishes of the sea,
whales and sturgeons, which are royal fihes,... and the king shall have wild
swans, as royal fowls, on the sea and branches of it.
8 7
word park indeed properly signifies an enclosure; but yet it is not every field or common,
which a gentleman pleases to surround with a wall or paling, and to stock with a herd of
deer, that is thereby constituted a legal park: for the king's grant, or at least immemorial
prescription, is necessary to make it so.... [I]t is unlawful at common law for any
person to kill any beasts of park or chase, except such as possess these franchises of
forest, chase or park.
fi)ee-warren is a similar franchise, erected for preservation or custody (which the
word signifies) of beasts and fowls of warren; which, being ferae naturae, every one had
a natural right to kill as he could; but upon the introduction of the forest laws, at the
Norman conquest.., these animals being looked upon as royal game and the sole
property of our savage monarchs, this franchise of free-warren was invented to protect
them; by giving the grantee a sole and exclusive power of killing such game so far as his
warren extended, on condition of his preventing other persons .... [N]o man, not even a
lord of a manor, could by common law justify sporting on another's soil, or even on his
own, unless he had the liberty of free-warren ....
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *38-39. See also RICHARD BURN, 1 THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 437
(Henry Lintot ed., London 1755) (defining warren as "a place privileged by prescription or grant
of the King, for the preservation of the beasts and fowl of the warren; viz. hares, conees,
partridges, and pheasants").
83 On the necessity of a grant from the king, see Sutton v. Moody, (1698) 91 Eng. Rep. 1063
(KB.) and GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 201-203 (discussing Sutton v. Moody).
84 78 Eng. Rep. at 794. It is, the court held, "unreasonable" to hold a person liable when he
has no interest in the "savage and wild" rabbits. Id.
85 Id (emphasis added).
86 Le Case Del Royall Piscarie de la Banne [The Case of the Royal Fishery of Banne], (1611)
80 Eng. Rep. 540 (KB.). For a translation of the original French, see GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, sUpra
note 2, at 272.
87 80 Eng. Rep. at 541-42 (emphasis added). The decision that the king was the owner of the
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In each of these cases, the Queen is said to "own" the disputed wildlife
as an incident of her prerogative or royalty. How can prerogative-that is, a
power, the exercise of which, is beyond review-create property? What is it
that navigable rivers, swans, whales, and animals ferae naturae, such as
conies and deer, share? These now seem strange questions and to
understand them requires a reorientation of perspective.
Blackstone defined prerogative as "that special pre-eminence, which
the king has over and above all other persons... in right of his regal
dignity."s This preeminence flows from "the king's political person"89 and
includes the attributes of "sovereignty,"" "perfection,"" and "perpetuity."
92
The fact that perfection and perpetuity are not actual human attributes is the
key: the king is both a human being and the physical embodiment of the
government.9 3 Obviously, the king-as-human is neither perfect nor immortal;
the king-as-government, however, is assumed to be both.94
In his list of prerogative powers, Blackstone discussed the king's
interest in wildlife:
[bly the feudal law all navigable rivers and havens were computed among the
regalia [royalties], and were subject to the sovereign of the state. And in
England it hath always been holden, that the king is lord of the whole shore,
soil-and, therefore, of the fishery-in a navigable stream was effectively a presumption. As the
court also noted, "by the common law of England, a man may have a proper and several [i.e.,
private] interest, as well in a water or river, as in a fishery; and therefore a water may be
granted .... If one grants to another aquam suam, the fishery in it shall pass, because it is
included in the word aqua" Id at 541 (emphasis in translation). As the court noted in a
subsequent case, either the soil or the fishery itself might be held by another person:
In case of a private river, the lord's having the soil is good evidence to prove, that he hath
the right of fishing; and it puts the proof upon them that claim lberam piscariam. But in
the case of a river that flows and reflows, and is an arm of the sea, there, prima facie, it is
common to all: and if any will appropriate a privilege to himself, the proof lieth on his
side.
Lord f'tzwalter's Case, (1674) 86 Eng. Rep. 766 (KB.). Thus, the presumption is rebuttable and
can be overcome by showing a grant or a prescriptive right that altered the default position.
88 BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *239. Cf 2 BRACTON, supra note 71, at 58 (distinguishing
between the "ruling king" and the "crown": "A thing belonging to the fsc is also quasisacred
and cannot be given or sold or transferred to another by the prince or reigning king; such things
constitute the crown itself and concern the common welfare"); EDWARDO COKE, THE FIRST PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON f. 90b (lst Am.
ed., Philadelphia 1853) (1628) ("legally [prerogative] extends to all powers, preheminences, and
privileges which the law giveth to the crowne"); SIR MATrHEW HALE'S THE PREROGATIVES OF THE
KING (D.E.C. Yale ed. 1976) (1640) (setting out a catalogue of powers rather than formal
definition). See generaly ERNST H. KANTOROWIcZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES 172-73 (1957)
(discussing the "distinction ... to be drawn between matters affecting the king alone in relation
to individual subjects, and matters affecting all subjects").
89 BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *240.
90 Id at *241.
91 Id at *246.
92 Id. at *249.
93 This reflects the Tudor "mystic fiction" of the "King's Two Bodies"-his human and
governmental selves. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 88, at 3.
94 Thus the familiar phrase "The king can do no wrong." DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO LAw 702 (1980).
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and particularly is the guardian of the ports and havens, which are the inlets
and gates of the realm. 95
The king's power over navigable rivers thus flows from his responsibility as
guardian of the country. As Commander in Chief, in modem parlance, the
king had the prerogative powers necessary to defend the kingdom.
96
Furthermore, "the right to royal fish" (such as whales and sturgeons),
Blackstone noted, was "said to be grounded on the consideration of his
guarding and protecting the seas from pirates and robbers."97 The king's
prerogative ownership of royal fishes, in other words, was part of his
ownership of navigable waters because the greater includes the lesser.
Similarly, the king's sovereign power over animals ferae naturae (or, at least,
game animals) flowed from his power to create forests and grant the hunting
franchises of chase and warren-otherwise he would be conveying
something he did not own,"
A kindred logic is reflected in the sovereign ownership of swans. In the
Case of Swans, the court held that "a swan... being of its nature a fowl
Royal, doth belong to the King."99 The swan was of its nature "royal," the
court noted, because "the cock swan is an emblem or representation of an
affectionate and true husband to his wife above all other fowls."10 ° Swans
were royal, in other words, because they were-like the king-the peak of
perfection. This point was explicitly stated in a contemporaneous case
involving a possible gold mine:
[The first reason] why the King shall have mines and ores of gold or silver
within the realm, in whatsoever land they are found ... was, in respect of the
excellency of the thing, for of all things which the soil within this realm
produces or yields gold and silver is the most excellent; and of all persons in
the realm the King is in the eye of the law most excellent. 101
95 BLAcKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *264.
96 Id. at *262-66.
97 Id. at *290.
98 Id at *289. For our purpose, one crucial point to note is what the king's prerogative
power to create hunting franchises says about land ownership. The granting of a franchise was
effectively an assertion of royal power as both a positive and a negative. Granting a hunting
franchise was a positive assertion of power because it asserted power over wildlife. But it was
also a negative assertion-the grant of a franchise also implicitly creates a limitation: that which
is not granted is retained. A landowner who does not have a warren cannot "of right" hunt on
his own property; the fee, in other words, does not include a power to hunt. This negative
power could form the basis for other, more traditional regulatory acts since the King necessarily
had the power to protect his property from acts of third parties including landowners on which
the wildlife might be found. Property and regulation, thus, are not always in opposition:
property can also be a form of regulation.
99 The Case of Swans, (1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435, 436 (KB.).
100 Id at 437.
101 The Case of Mines, (1568) 75 Eng. Rep. 472, 479 (KB.). In the case, the Queen's attorneys
argued that "all mines and ores of gold or silver, which are in the lands of subjects, with power
to dig the land, and carry away the ore, and other incidents thereto, belong of right to the King
of this realm by prerogative." The court continued:
And the common law, which is founded upon reason, appropriates every thing to the
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Thus "prerogative" is a historical hodge-podge: recognizable bits of
sovereignty blended with a now-enigmatic logic. The statement in the Case
of Swans that swans, whales, and sturgeons "belong to the King by his
prerogative"" 2 is one example: the king's responsibility as guardian of the
country is transmogrified into the ownership of "fish" such as whales. The
powers of the king-as-government (in a time when government was itself
property-like) were almost-necessarily conceived to be property-like. Since
the king's subjects could own swans or hunt deer only if they had a grant
from the king, the king must a priori own all swans and deer not granted-
and this gave the king the power to regulate activities affecting swans and
deer because they were his "property." The power to govern gives rise to
ownership because the power to govern is itself a question of ownership.
Thus, for Blackstone--like Bracton'03 and Walmsley' ° before him-the king
owned animals ferae naturae.
3. Sovereignty and Property
Relying on this handful of precedents and the fundamental proposition
of feudalism that "the king is the ultimate proprietor of all the lands in the
kingdom,"0 5 Blackstone concluded that "the property of such animals ferae
naturae, as are known by the denomination of game, with the right of
pursuing, taking, and destroying them... is vested in the king alone" by his
prerogative.0 6 Blackstone's view was sharply contested by Edward
Christian, the editor of an annotated edition of Blackstone and the author of
an 1821 treatise on game laws.107 Christian argued that "game does not
belong to the King" because
persons whom it best suits, as common and trivial things to common people, things of
more worth to persons in a higher and superior class, and things most excellent to those
persons who excel all others; and because gold and silver are the most excellent things
which the soil contains, the law has appointed them (as in reason it ought) to the person
who is most excellent, and that is the King.
Id
102 77 Eng. Rep. at 436.
103 3 BRACTON, supr note 71, at 166.
104 Bowlston v. Hardy, (1597) 78 Eng. Rep. 794, 794 (KB.).
105 BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES "415. Since "he has the right of the universal soil, [he also
has the right] to enter thereon, and to chase and take such creatures as his pleasure." Id This
principle was buttressed by another. "[Tihese animals are bona vacantia [unclaimed goods],
and, having no other owner, belong to the king by his prerogative." Id.
106 Id at *410.
107 The chapter in the treatise titled "Game does not belong to the King" is a reprint of
Christian's note in his edition of Blackstone. EDWARD CHRISTIAN, A TREATISE ON THE GAME LAWS
22-38 (J. & W.T. Clarke eds., London 1821). The Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law
reports that Edward Christian was the brother of Fletcher Christian of HMS Bounty fame (or
infamy). He is also described as a "[f]ailure at the bar" who became a professor at Cambridge-
an example of the belief of generations of law students that professors teach because they
cannot practice. Lord Ellenborough observed that he was "fit only to rule a copybook." He is
reported to have died "[iun the full vigour of his incapacity." BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
COMMON LAW 114 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1984).
20051
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[i]f all wild animals belonged to the crown, it would have been superfluous to
have specified whales, sturgeons, and swans. Lord Coke tells us, that "a swan is
a royal fowl; and all those the property whereof is not known, do belong to the
king by his prerogative: and so whales and sturgeons are royal fish, and belong
to the king by his prerogative:" Case of Swans,.... But these are the only
animals which our law has conferred this honour upon.1
8
Although the English courts eventually sided with Christian, °9
Blackstone was more compatible with the new republican governments in
America, which shared his abhorrence of the hierarchical social structure
embedded in the English game laws. 0
108 BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *419 n.9 (New York, W.E. Dean 1832) (this edition, among
others, includes Christian's notes). To bolster his argument, Christian cited an early case
holding that the king had no property in deer that escaped from a forest, as well as dicta from
The Case of Monopolies.
[Ilt is true, that none can make a park, chase, or warren, without the King's license, for
that is [in a certain way] to appropriate those creatures which are ferae naturae, [and
among the property of no person] to himself, and to restrain them in their natural liberty,
which he cannot do without the King's license; but for hawking, hunting, &c. which are
matters of pastime, pleasure, and recreation, there needs no license, but every one may,
in his own land, use them at his pleasure, without any restraint to be made, unless by
Parliament.
Id (quoting The Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1264 (KB.)).
109 See Blades v. Higgs, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1474 (H.L.) (noting that the issue remained
unsettled in England until 1865, when a decision by the House of Lords determined that the
landowner, as an incident of ownership of the soil, had a right to the wild animals on her
property).
110 See THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAw 21-24 (1980) (noting that Blackstone's view
was more compatible with America's frontier condition); JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE
WILDLIFE? 146-47 (1981) (noting Blackstone's support for a more non-discriminatory system of
access to game). During the colonial period, the right to hunt in England was restricted to the
upper classes; substantial penalties-including involuntary transportation to America and
death-were imposed for violation of game laws. Id at 146. During the same period, the
abundance of game in America and the equality of opportunity to kill it "were important
symbols of liberty in the pictures painted for the purposes of generating settlement and
financial backing for colonial ventures." Id. at 4. This hostility to the game laws can be seen in
cases such as State v. Campbell, T.U.P.C. 166 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1808), in which the defendant was
indicted under the Waltham Black Act, 9 Geo. 1, ch. 22 (1723), for unlawful hunting. The
defendant argued that the statute had never been in force in Georgia because it was
founded upon a tender solicitude for the amusement and property of the aristocracy of
England. It was made to protect from the violation or profanation of the people, the
forest of his majesty or the park of a peer. How then could it apply to a country which
was but one extended forest, in which the liberty of killing a deer, or cutting down a tree,
was as unrestrained as the natural rights of the deer to rove, or the tree to grow?
Id at 167-68. The court concurred, concluding that the statute "is not only penal to a feudal
degree, but it is productive of tyranny." Id. at 168. See also Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 5
(1840) (noting oppressiveness of English game laws); Sterling v. Jackson, 37 N.W. 845, 865-66
(Mich. 1888) (Morse, J., dissenting) (noting that game laws in England were inconsistent with
American Institutions); Broughton v. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (26 Nott & McC.) 338, 341 (1820)
(holding that hunting on unenclosed lands is not a trespass); M'Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2
Mill) 244, 246 (1818) (holding that a landowner cannot deny the right to hunt on unenclosed
lands); New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 35 A. 323, 328 (Vt, 1896) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting) (noting the unjust nature of English game laws).
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B. Arnold v. Mundy: Republiecanizing Royal Prerogative
Robert Arnold purchased several boatloads of oysters and planted them
in the Raritan River in front of his farm. He marked off the area "and drove
off, so far as he was able, every one who attempted to take oysters without
his leave.""' When Benajah Mundy "came, at the head of a small fleet of
skiffs, and took away the oysters,"1 2 Arnold brought suit.
The issue was presented to the court in terms of property. The plaintiff
claimed that the right to fish (including the right to take shellfish) was an
incident of the ownership of the soil 13 and that he owned the submerged
lands in front of his farm under a grant from the Proprietors.11 4 The
defendant, on the other hand, contended that "all the citizens of the state
had a common right to take oysters therein" because the Raritan was
navigable." 5 He argued that the Proprietors could not usurp the public right
by creating inconsistent private rights."
6
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick began his analysis by tracing title to the land
in question.117 In March 1664, Charles H granted his brother James, the Duke
of York, a patent to a substantial part of North America."' In June, James
sold the land that became the colony of New Jersey to Lord Berkeley and Sir
George Carteret." 9 Through a variety of conveyances, the grants passed to
the Proprietors. The grant from Charles to James (and from James to his
successors in interest) included the power to govern. 20 James, in other
words, was granted the sovereign powers of the king. In 1702, however, the
Proprietors reconveyed the power to govern to Queen Anne.121 The issue
thus becomes, what was conveyed by the retrocession? Specifically, is title
to the submerged lands an incident of property or sovereignty?
Had this been England, the answer would have been the same as that in
The Case of the Royal Fshery of Banne. the submerged lands belonged to
the king "by his prerogative." 22 New Jersey, however, did not have a king;
111 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 2 (1821). Professor Rasband offers a different perspective on
Arnold v. Mundy. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997).
112 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 2.
113 Plaintiff claimed a "several fishery"-an interest technically classified as a profit a'
prendre. Seymour v. Courtenay, (1771) 98 Eng. Rep. 478, 478 (KB.).
114 The "Proprietors" were the successors in interest to the first grantee, the Duke of York, of
Charles II, King of England. The Proprietors continued to sell land in the colony and then in the
state after the Revolution. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 7.
115 Id. at 3. Mundy claimed that the fishery was a "common fishery" (communispiscaria), a
right like other commons such as a common of pasture: it is a nonexclusive and limited right.
Smith v. Kemp, (1693) 91 Eng. Rep. 537, 537-38 (K.B.). The most widespread common fishery
was the right of the public to fish in navigable waters.
116 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 3-4.
117 See generalyid at 1 (beginning with an extensive explanation of the history of the land);
see also Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 369-80 (1842) (explaining how the
title of land was passed down).
118 Martin, 41 U.S. at 369.
119 Id. at 374.
120 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 70.
121 Martin, 41 U.S. at 380.
122 The Case of the Royal Fishery of Banne, (1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540, 541-42 (KB.).
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thus, there was a need to parse the concept of "prerogative" into the at-the-
time-more-distinct categories of property and sovereignty. Beginning with
Emer de Vattel and William Blackstone, the court offered a typology of
property, noting that, although "everything susceptible of property is
considered as belonging to the nation that possesses the country,... the
nation does not possess all those things in the same manner."1 2 3 Most things
are divided up among individuals as private property, while other things that
have not been so divided are public property.12 4 Some public property
(public domain) is used to benefit the public by meeting the needs of the
government and some public property (common property) "remain[s]
common to all the citizens, who take of them and use them, each according
to his necessities, and according to the laws which regulate their use."'25 The
latter include air, water, the sea, and animals ferae naturae.12 6 Although
these things are common property, title to them cannot be vested in all the
people "according to the common law notion of tile... therefore, the
wisdom of that law placed common property in the hands of the sovereign
power, to be held, protected, and regulated for the common use and
benefit."'2 7 Thus, the right to fish in navigable waters was "a royal fishery,
and belongs to the king by his prerogative,"128 so that the king's interest was
in some sense proprietary. But the fact that the public had rights to fish in
such fisheries without any grant from the king suggested that the king did
123 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 71.
124 Id.
125 Id The court followed Vattel:
Let us now see what is the nature of the different things contained in the country
possessed by a nation, and endeavour to establish the general principles of the law by
which they are regulated. This subject is treated by civilians under the title de rerum
divisione. There are things which in their own nature cannot be possessed: there are
others, of which nobody claims the property, and which remain common, as in their
primitive state, when a nation takes possession of a country: the Roman lawyers called
those things res communes; things common: such were, with them, the air, the running
water, the sea, fish, and wild beasts.
Every thing susceptible of property is considered as belonging to the nation that
possesses the country, and as forming the aggregate mass of its wealth. But the nation
does not possess all those things in the same manner. Those not divided between
particular communities, or among the individuals of the nation, are called public
property. Some are reserved for the necessities of the state, and form the demesne of the
crown, or of the republic: others remain common to all the citizens, who take advantage
of them, each according to his necessities, or according to the laws which regulate their
use; and these are called common property.... Finally, the property belonging to
individuals is termed private property, res singulormn.
VATTEL, supra note 14, at bk. 1, §§ 234-235; see also BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *14 (noting
that animals ferae naturae are an example of "some few things, which, notwithstanding the
general introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in common").
126 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 71.
127 Id The court bolstered this conclusion by citing The Case of the Royal Fishery of Banne,
(1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B.); Lord FYtzwalter's Case, (1674) 86 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B.); Warren v.
Matthews, (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 831 (K.B.); Carter v. Murco; (1768) 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B).
128 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 74 (quoting the Kings Bench in The Case of the RoyalFishery of Banne,
(1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1611).
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not "own" the submerged lands as a private person; his interest therefore
was that of a "sovereign." This led the court to conclude that the king's title
was as trustee for the public:
[B]y the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all the social rights;
that by the civil law, which formerly governed almost the whole civilized world,
and which is still the foundation of the polity of almost every nation in Europe;
that by the common law of England, of which our ancestors boasted, and to
which it were well if we ourselves paid a more sacred regard;... by all these,
the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the
coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land under the water, for the
purpose of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and
all the other uses of the water and its products (a Few things excepted) are
common to all the citizens, and that each has a right to use them according to
his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use; that the
property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in the sovereign, but it is vested in
him not for his own use, but for the use of the citizen, that is, for his direct and
immediate enjoyment.1
29
Given the nature of the title held by the king, he could convey no greater
power to the Proprietors.
Furthermore, the Proprietors had retroceded sovereignty-and hence
their interest as trustee-to the Queen. Therefore, after the Revolution,
"these royal rights became vested in the people of New Jersey, as sovereign
of the country." 30 The people, in turn, delegated this power to the state-
subject to any inconsistent powers subsequently granted to the federal
government. 3 1 Thus, republican ideology transformed the royal prerogative
into a trust to be exercised for the public's benefit.
C After Mundy: State Ownership as a Lim't on Capture
During the nineteenth century, state and federal judges, following the
lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court of Judicature, transformed the jumble
of English precedent into a relatively coherent body of wildlife law. Broadly,
the courts concluded that fishing rights were an incident of the title to lands
beneath the waterway, which was determined by the navigability of the
waterway. "Navigability," in other words, became a marker for the line
between public and private. 2 These conclusions reflected both a reading of
129 Id at 76-77.
130 Id. at 78. Arnold thus had no claim to the submerged lands fronting his farm; planting the
oysters was a loss of possession that left them available for the next capturer, Benejah Mundy
and his colleagues. See id at 93 (Rossell, J., concurring); see also Shepard v. Leverson, 2 N.J.L.
369, 373 (1808) (holding that planting oysters in a common fishery is a complete abandonment);
Brinckerhoff v. Starkins, 11 Barb. 248, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851) (holding that planting oysters
does not give the planter a possessory right in the oysters).
131 The most significant of the powers subsequently granted to the federal government in the
context of navigable water ways was the Commerce Power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
132 The question of what was "navigable" proved at least initially problematic. Some courts
followed what they took to be the English law that navigability depended upon whether the
waterway was subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. E.g, Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481, 483
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the English case law and a theory of popular sovereignty: the king had
owned the lands beneath navigable waterways as a sovereign and, upon the
Revolution, this sovereignty passed to the people. Arnold v. Mundy was a
crucial step in this evolution. 33
Through a parallel process, state and federal judges concluded that the
state also had an ownership interest in wildlife. The development of the
"state ownership" doctrine (as it came to be known) is a classic example of
the process by which the common law is transformed by its analogical
categories. Beginning with the proposition from Arnold v. Mundy that the
state-as-trustee owned the land beneath navigable waters, the courts initially
concluded that this also gave the state an interest in the oysters growing on
that soil. In a case testing the power of a state to prohibit non-citizens from
harvesting oysters, 33 Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington (sitting as
Circuit Justice) relied upon the state's ownership of the shellfish to justify
his decision that the state statute was not unconstitutional under either the
Commerce Clause' 35 or the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 13 Noting, for
example, that the Commerce Clause did not "interfere with [the power] of
the state to regulate its internal trade,"'37 Washington concluded, "much less
can that power [over interstate commerce] impair the right of the state
governments to legislate, in such manner as in their wisdom may seem best,
over the public property of the state."35 Like the court in Arnold,
Washington turned to Vattel in deciding that the state's proprietary interests
extended to "fisheries of all descriptions," including "oyster beds within the
territorial limits of [the] state.
" 139
Sovereign ownership was extended from shellfish to fin fish. In
Dunham v. Lamphere, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw'40 upheld a state statute
(1818); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 378 (1867); Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 100
(N.Y. 1822). Other courts were more receptive to the geographic realities and focused on the
actual navigability of the waterbody. Eg., Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 484 (Pa. 1810);
McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 53 (1856); Ingram v. Threadgill, 14 N.C. 59, 61 (1831).
133 Other cases in this evolution include Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221
(1845); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 416 (1842); Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn.
481, 484 (1818); Pftkin v. Olmstead, 1 Root 217, 219 (Conn. 1790); and Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn.
475, 485 (Pa. 1810). See generally GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 282-99 (tracing the
evolution of public rights in waterways).
134 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa- 1823) (No. 3,230).
135 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
136 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
137 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 550 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
13 Id. at 551.
19 Id, In a subsequent Supreme Court decision, the Court analogized oysters to corn: "The
planting of oysters in the soil covered by water owned in conunon by the people of the State is
not different in principle from that of planting corn upon dry land held in the same way."
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876).
140 69 Mass. 268, 274 (1855). Lemuel Shaw (1781-1861) was one of the leading jurists of his
day. After serving in the Massachusetts legislature, he served as Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1830-1860. Among his influential opinions was
Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296-97 (1850), establishing negligence as the primary
standard for liability in tort, and Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 62 (1851),
discussing the "police power." Alger is considered Wnfra at notes 195-202. See generally
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957).
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prohibiting the use of seines within a mile of the Nantucket shore. Shaw also
drew upon Vattel: "like other valuable commodities, fish, as well swimming
as shell fish, are susceptible of being property; and every such thing, says
Vattel,... is considered as belonging to the nation that possesses the
country, as forming part of the aggregate mass of its wealth; those not
divided are called public property."14 1 The final step was to extend state
sovereign ownership to all wildlife-a step that seemed natural since fish
and wildlife were treated identically by both common-law1 42 and civilian
writers.
143
But there was a core ambiguity in the doctrine, an ambiguity that
reflects its origin in the concept of prerogative: was the state's claim one
founded on sovereignty (that it had the power to regulate capture), property
(that it owned the wildlife), or some combination of the two? Throughout
the Corfield decision, for example, Washington commingled the language of
property and the language of sovereignty. At some points he treated the
state's power as an incident of the ownership of the soil; in others, his
language suggested that it was sovereignty over the soil that was crucial.I"
Nor was Washington alone in his seeming uncertainty as to the source
of the state's power. In a related case decided in state court, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, "[a]s to the ownership of property
in oysters, while lying in the Bay of Delaware... the judge [in the decision
below said,] 'Although, perhaps, they [the citizens of the state] may not have
a right of absolute property in these articles, they... may, nevertheless, pass
regulations for their preservation.'"145 The court upheld this instruction.
Similarly, as Chief Justice Shaw noted in Dill v. Inhabitants of Wareham,146
the propertyof the coasts, bays, and arms of the sea, and of the fishery therein,
was in the king; but in trust, as to fisheries, for all the king's subjects .... By
the colony charters, this right of the crown was transferred, with the territory
141 Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 268, 270 (1855) (emphasis added). See also
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 263 (1890) (holding that state fishing regulations did
not conflict with federal authority to regulate the same waters); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391, 396 (1876) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law granting its citizens exclusive use
of its fisheries); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855) (holding that state police
power extends to the seabed beneath navigable waters and does not conflict with federal power
to regulate commerce).
142 E., BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *391-92.
143 E.g, VATTEL, supranote 14, at bk.1, § 234.
144 Washington argued:
Although wild beasts, birds, and fishes, which have not been caught, have never in fact
been appropriated, so as to separate them from the common stock to which all men are
equally entitled, yet where the exclusive right in the water and soil which a person has
occasion to use in taking them is vested in others, no other persons can claim the liberty
of hunting, fishing, or fowling, on lands, or waters, which are so appropriated. "The
sovereign," says Grotius ... , "who has dominion over the land, or waters, in which the
fish are, may prohibit foreigners (by which expression we understand him to mean
others than the subjects or citizens of the state) from taking them."
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
145 Kean v. Rice, 12 Serg. & Rawle 203, 209 (Pa. 1824).
146 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 438 (1844).
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and jurisdiction, to the colonies, for the use and benefit of the inhabitants. This
vested the power in the colonial governments to make laws, to regulate and
protect this, as one of the common rights of the inhabitants.
147
The New York Court of Appeals was even more explicit:
The people in their sovereign corporate capacity own the beds of all navigable
waters within the state. They are held for the common benefit, and to promote
the convenience and enjoyment of all the citizens, and not in the manner the
capitol and public buildings are owned .... One of the purposes for which the
people own the beds of such waters is to protect and regulate the rights of
fishing in them. 148
Some decisions emphasized property, 149 others sovereignty, 150 and others
freely mingled the concepts.1 5 1 Indeed, many of the decisions reflect a web
comprised of common law property concepts (such as the common fishery),
the public interest, and state ownership.
5 2
147 Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added).
148 Smith v. Levinus, 8 N.Y. 472, 473-74 (1853).
149 Eg, Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass. 140, 144-45 (1808) (noting that "the property in the
fish, and also in all tide waters, is in the public"); see also Boatwright v. Bookman, 24 S.C.L.
(Rice) 447, 451 (1839) (holding that "an obstruction to the free passage of fish in a public
navigable river, is... a public nuisance").
150 E.g., Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482, 486 (1844) ("The State may regulate its navigable
waters, and the fisheries within them; yet all the citizens are entitled as of common right to fish
in those waters"); Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353, 357 (1841) ("navigation may be
impeded, if in the judgment of [sovereign] power the public good requires it").
151 E.g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264-65 (1890); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391, 394-95 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-75 (1855); Gentile v. State,
29 Ind. 409, 417 (1868); Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 268, 270-73 (1855); Hallock v.
Dominy, 7 Hun. 52, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1876).
152 Compare Fuller v. Spear, 14 Me. 417, 418 (1837) (holding that the legislature has the
power to regulate fisheries in navigable waters that would otherwise be public), and Burnham
v. Webster, 5 Mass. (4 Tyng) 266, 269 (1809) (stating that the legislature may regulate the taking
of fish and that this regulation is for the public benefit), with Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 397
(1824) (stating that every person has a common law right to fish unless that right is
extinguished by regulation), and People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 211-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)
(reaffirming that fishing in navigable waters is a public right and stating that the legislature has
the authority to regulate this right but that the legislature may not regulate fishing rights in
private waters without compensating the owner whose rights are taken), State v. Glen, 52 N.C.
(7 Jones) 321, 325 (1859) (recognizing the common right to fish in navigable waters), Cottrill v.
Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 229-30 (1835) (stating that the public has the right to regulate the interior
fisheries), Vinton v. Welsh, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 87, 91, 92 (1829) (holding that the legislature may
regulate fisheries to further the public interest), hihabitants of Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. (3
Tyng) 522, 528 (1808) (holding that the public right to a fishery prevents a landowner from
constructing a dam that interrupts that fishery by completely blocking spawning ground), and
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 9 (1821) (stating that the right to fish navigable waters is vested in
the people and the government may make regulations in the interest of protecting this resource
for its citizens). It was only as the courts abandoned the feudal perspective, which treated most
relationships as forms of property, that they began to separate out what now seem distinct
strands: that states have the power to regulate land uses and conduct up to the point that the
regulation infringes some constitutional prohibition even if there are no identifiable common or
governmental property interests involved. This change had largely occurred by the Civil War. A
similar conjunction of seemingly disparate doctrines lies at the core of the state ownership
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These cases are often like the picture of an ancestor: there is both a
family resemblance and something undeniably alien. On one hand, they feel
ancient with the Blackstonian classification of rights and the oddness of
inquiring whether the obstruction of a stream is a public nuisance or only an
injury to the property of upstream riparian landowners.153 On the other hand,
the cases are concerned with the very current question of the proper balance
between public and private interests.
This evolution was recapitulated by the Supreme Court at the end of the
nineteenth century. The defendant in Geer v. Connecticut3 appealed his
conviction for possession of woodcock, ruffed grouse, and quail "with the
wrongful and unlawful intent to procure transportation beyond the limits of
the State."15 Following a meander through Athenian, Roman, and French
feudal law, the Court turned to Blackstone and several state cases before
concluding:
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game
rest have undergone no change, the development of free institutions has led to
the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the State,
resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers
of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative
for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good. Therefore,
for the purpose of exercising this power, the State... represents its people, and
the ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty.
156
In addition to property language, however, the Court also speaks of
sovereignty, concluding the decision by noting:
Aside from the authority of the State, derived from the common ownership of
game and the trust for the benefit of its people which the State exercises in
relation thereto, there is another view of the power of the State in regard to the
property in game, which is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game flows
from the undoubted existence in the State of a police power to that end.
157
Thus, property and sovereignty were metaphorically and legally joined in
wildlife. In England, the court would have spoken of the Crown's
"prerogative" which was a conjunction of property and sovereignty. Royal
prerogative, however, was unacceptable in America. Hence the need for
different terminology.
doctrine.
153 See, e.g., People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216 (N.Y. 1819) (holding that the state lacked
power to regulate dam that obstructed fish run because the defendant owned its entire length);
Woolever v. Stewart, 36 Ohio St. 146, 150-151 (1880) (holding that only upstream riparian
landowners can object to obstruction of fish runs in a nonnavigable stream and state statute
requiring dam owner to add fishways was void).
154 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
155 Id at 520.
156 Id. at 529.
157 Id. at 534.
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Beginning with the proposition that the king-as-sovereign was the
owner of navigable rivers and wildlife, the New Jersey Supreme Court of
Judicature offered a translation into the new jurisprudence of popular
sovereignty: the state held legal title to wildlife in trust for the people."t The
result was a blending of the two ways to talk about power over things. First,
there was proprietary power, embodied in concepts of property and title.
Second, there was sovereign power, represented by the government's
authority-granted by the sovereign people-to regulate conduct.
In the case of wildlife, however, neither of these powers, whether alone
or conjoined, seemed quite right. Searching for a better description, the
courts mingled the categories: the expansive nature of government's role
was recognized by vesting it with both title to game and absolute
governmental control. But this blended power also seemed inaccurate
because the combined powers gave the government too much discretion.
Unlike a private owner who might use wildlife solely for personal gain, when
the government was the owner its powers were constrained by the public
interest.
Thus, the government's proprietary rights could be exercised only for
the use and benefit of the people of the states and not for the benefit of an
individual or special group. The government's absolute regulatory power
was similarly limited by the "common right of the people."'59 The metaphor
employed to describe this mixture of sovereign and proprietary powers was
the trust: the state was a trustee for the people and state sovereign
ownership was a public trust."0
This perspective solved at least two jurisprudential problems. Not only
did it convert monarchy to republic, it also offered a vantage point that
helped to resolve questions surrounding the new and novel relationship
between national and state governments: as state property, wildlife was
neither commerce nor a privilege and immunity to be shared with the
citizens of other states. 
161
158 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 31 (1821).
159 Id at 35.
160 Courts have relied on English law to find that the sovereign must act with regard to the
best interests of the people. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Peck v.
Lockwood, 5 Day 22 (Conn. 1811); Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353 (1841); Dill v.
Inhabitants of Wareham, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 438 (1844); Percy Summer Club v. Welch, 28 A. 22
(N.H. 1890); State v. Welch, 28 A. 21 (N.H. 1890); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Rogers v.
Jones, 1 Wend. 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 Serg. & Rawle
71 (Pa. 1826); State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561 (1850).
161 E.g, Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 533-35 (1896) (finding that animals in the food
supply may never become "the object of commerce except with the consent of the state" and
subject to the interests of the public good); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264-66
(1890) (concluding that the absence of congressional action placed control over fish with the
state); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395-96 (1876) (finding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not vest rights in the common property of one state with citizens of
another state); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-76 (1855) (holding that a state may
exercise the authority to stop and detain ships that violate state oyster protection laws without
conflicting with the Commerce Clause); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 388 (1842)
(recognizing the idea of the common right to protect wildlife from "encroachment by citizens of
other states"); Corfield v. Coryel, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 549 (C.C.E.D. Pa 1823) (No. 3,230) (finding
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies only to citizenship and not to the common
[Vol. 35:807
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This conjunction of sovereignty and property-state sovereign
ownership-provided a storyline for judicial decisions over the course of the
nineteenth century.162 The blending of property and sovereignty in the
ownership-because-sovereign formula of the state ownership doctrine
defines the special relationship that the state has to animals ferae naturae-
a relationship that reflects the unique quality of wildlife as common
property.
Although Arnold v. Mundy and its progeny solved one set of problems
by defining wildlife as a public trust, they raised others. What, for example,
is the relationship between this public trust property interest and private
property in land? That is, what is the relationship between private property
and common property-when the public property is something that can
wander willy-nilly across human boundaries?
IV. INHABITANTS OFSTOUGHTON v BA!KER. ANIMALs FERAE NATURAE AS A LIMIT
ON PROPERTY IN LAND (THE WILDLIFE EASEMENT)
In 1633, the town of Dorchester, Massachusetts granted Israel
Stoughton a mill site on the Neponset River and "an exclusive right to take
shad and alewives.., with a condition that he was to sell the alewives [to
the residents of the town] at five shillings the thousand, and other fish at
reasonable rates."163 More than 170 years later, the Massachusetts legislature
appointed a committee to investigate the various dams on the Neponset and
to determine what changes should be made to ensure that anadromous fish
were able to proceed upstream to spawn. The legislature specified that
property of a state). Neither proposition remains good law. Geer was overruled by Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (overruling Geer as an impermissible state regulation
interfering with Congress's power to regulate commerce). On the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (explaining that a "state's
interest in its wildlife and other resources must yield when, without reason, it interferes with a
nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is protected
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause").
162 By the close of the nineteenth century state sovereign ownership of animals ferae naturae
was the black-letter law. See, e.g, Organ v. State, 19 S.W. 840, 840 (Ark. 1892) (fish); Ex parte
Maier, 37 P. 402, 402 (Cal. 1894) (deer); leck v. Anderson, 57 Cal. 251, 251 (1881) (fish); Hayden
v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 392 (1824) (oysters); Magner v. People, 97 III. 320, 326 (1881) (quail);
Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409, 409 (1868) (fish); Eubank v. Pence, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 338, 338 (1824)
(fish); Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 223 (1835) (fish); Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. (2
Tyng) 530, 530 (1807) (salmon, shad, and alewives); People v. Collison, 48 N.W. 292, 292 (Mich.
1891) (fish); State v. N. Pac. Express Co., 59 N.W. 1100, 1100 (Minn. 1894) (fish); State v.
Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098, 1098 (Minn. 1894) (deer); State v. Blount, 85 Mo. 543, 544 (1885) (fish);
W. Point Water Power & Land Improvement Co. v. State exrel. Moodie, 66 N.W. 6, 6 (Neb. 1896)
(fish); State v. Franklin Falls Co., 49 N.H. 240, 241 (1870) (fish); Shoemaker v. State, 20 N.J.L.
153, 154 (1843) (fish); Phelps v. Racey, 60 N.Y. 10, 12-13 (1875) (gamebirds); Palmer v. Hicks, 6
Johns. 133, 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (clams); Fagan v. Armistead, 33 N.C. 433, 433 (1850) (fish);
Roth v. State, 37 N.E. 259, 259 (Ohio 1894) (quail); Woolever v. Stewart, 36 Ohio St. 146, 148
(1880) (fish); Kean v. Rice, 12 Serg. & Rawle 203, 203 (Pa. 1824) (oysters); State v. Cozzens, 2
R.I. 561, 561 (1850) (oysters); Boatwright v. Bookman, 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 447, 448 (1839) (fish);
McCready v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 982 (1876), affd sub nom. McCready v. Virginia,
94 U.S. 391, 391 (1876) (oysters); State ex rel. Curry v. Crawford, 44 P. 876, 876 (Wash. 1896)
(fish); Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 273 (Wis. 1898) (fish).
163 Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 522, 524 (1808).
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three-fourths of the cost of any changes were to be borne by the owners of
the dams. Following an evaluation of their milldam and modifications to it,
Edmund Baker and Daniel Vose, proprietors of Stoughton's grant, refused to
pay their share of the costs, contending that the legislature lacked the
constitutional power "to interfere and take from them their estate.""6 The
towns of Staughton, Sharon, and Canton sued to recover the statutory
amount due.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court began with the proposition
that the defendants' right was a fee interest that included the right to erect a
dam to raise the water to power the mill.165 But property interests, the court
noted, are not absolute. Rather, they are subject to "implied limitations,"
including those necessary
to protect the rights of the public in the fishery; so that the dam must be so
constructed that the fish should not be interrupted in their passage up the river
to cast their spawn. Therefore every owner of a water-mill or dam holds it on
the condition, or perhaps under the limitation, that a sufficient and reasonable
passage-way shall be allowed for the fish. This limitation, being for the benefit
of the public, is not extinguished by any inattention or neglect, in compelling
the owner to comply with it. 166
The state's action thus was constitutional-defendants' title was inherently
limited by the public's interest in ensuring the passage of fish through the
defendants' land.
167
164 Id. at 525.
165 Id. at 528.
166 Id.
167 Other courts reached the same conclusion. For the proposition that states have an
interest in and are within their constitutional powers regulating actions affecting fish
populations, see Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 599 (1884); Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409, 418
(1868); Lunt v Hunter, 16 Me. 9, 11 (1839); Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water
Power Co., 104 Mass. 446, 450 (1870), affld sub nom., Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
500 (1872); People v. Collison, 48 N.W. 292, 292 (Mich. 1891); West Point Water Power & Land
Improvement Co. v. State ex rel. Moodie, 66 N.W. 6, 8 (Neb. 1896); State v. Franklin Falls Co., 49
N.H. 240, 250-51 (1870); Shaw v. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 237-38 (M.Y. 1813) (per curiam);
State ex rel. Weller v: Snover, 42 N.J.L. 341, 346 (1880); Colmonwealth v. Bailey, 95 Mass (13
Allen) 541, 544 (1866). In the current terminology, the public interest in protecting wildlife and
its habitat is a background principle inhering in Baker and Vose's title. Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Comm., 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) ("Regulations that prohibit all economically
beneficial use of land... cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon landownership."). See generally Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical
Takings Defenses, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005). For a discussion of the impact of Lucas
on protecting endangered species, see Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered
Species, and What Does that Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect
Them Constitute "Takings?", 80 IowA L. REv. 297 (1995), and Hope M. Babcock, ShouldLucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links,
and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night; 85 IOwA L. REV. 849 (2000).
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2 TREE CASES/FOUR TALES
A. The Common-Law World of the Early RepubKc
In thinking of Baker and Vose's milldam, it is important to banish
nostalgic visions of moss-covered mills with their water wheels gently
turning in willow-draped streams. Although many of the dams were small,168
water was the major source of mechanical power in the United States until
at least the middle of the nineteenth century. 169 In addition, the grist and
sawmills that were powered by this water were central to the economies of
an agrarian society. As one author commented, "the deficiency of a mill [is]
inconsistent with the existence of civilized life." 70 As a result, state and local
governments often provided subsidies to encourage their construction-as
was the case with Dorchester's grant of the mill site to Israel Stoughton. 7 '
Baker and Vose, in short, were members of an economically powerful
industry.
In addition to adjusting one's technological perspective, a societal re-
envisioning is also necessary. Baker and Vose's society-like that of Israel
Stoughton-was a pubKc society in ways hard to imagine after the invention
of twentieth-century privacy. Its governance was predicated on the
elemental assumption that public interest was superior to private
interest." 72 Eighteenth and nineteenth century common-law judges viewed
humans not as autonomous individuals but as members of a community-
and, as such, dependent for their well-being on a healthy, functioning
community. Individuals held rights, but those rights arose out of, and were
constrained by, the duty of all citizens to conduct their affairs to sustain the
well-being of the whole.
The power to use one's property was one of the rights that was
constrained by the community's needs. 7 3 Millers opened their dams so that
fish could pass upstream to spawn; as part of the community, they were
unlikely to interfere with the fish runs given the importance of the
resource.'74 Had the millers refused to do so, the neighbors were likely to
168 Not all dams were small; the dam on the Merrimack River at Lawrence, Massachusetts
was the largest dam in the world when it was completed in 1848; the amount of water power it
generated exceeded the water power produced in all of France. THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE
INCORPORATED 79, 95 (1991).
169 1 Louis C. HUNTER, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1930, at 1
(1979); see also 1 J. LEANDER BISHOP, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES 122-32 (Augustus
M. Kelley Publishers 3d ed., 1966) (1868) (discussing the first mills in New England and their
impact on economic development).
170 1 HUNTER, supra note 169, at 30.
171 Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522, 524 (1808).
172 NOVAK, supra note 7, at 9.
173 See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the
Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1107-31 (2000) (chronicling a variety of ways early
government restricted the power to use one's property); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law
and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) (arguing
that government regulated beyond merely preventing harm).
174 As one early historian wrote, "[I]t was a time of rejoicing.., when spring came and the
salmon began to run." SAMUEL T. DOLE, WINDHAM IN THE PAST 275 (Frederick H. Dole ed., 1916).
See generally Gary Kulik, Dams, Fsh, and Farmers: Defense of Public Rights in Eighteenth-
Century Rhode Island, in THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION: ESSAYS
IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICA 25, 29-34 (Steven Hahn & Jonathan Prude eds., 1985)
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destroy the dams or summarily abate them as nuisances,175 or to appeal to
the legislature for relief: "[bly 1800, thirteen states had laws prohibiting mills
dams on some or all of their rivers from obstructing the passage of fish."'76
One measure of the importance of the public interest can be seen in the fact
that some of these statutes required the removal of existing dams.1
77
These communitarian restraints reflect the traditional common-law
perspective on the nature of the relationship between public and private
interests. This common-law vision of a "well ordered civil society"178
inspired lawyers, judges, and writers such as James Wilson,179 James Kent,18
Nathaniel Chipman, S1 and Zephaniah Swift." 2 Two common-law maxims
(discussing the challenges faced by New Englanders and their needs for water mills combined
with the struggle to keep salmon runs unhindered).
175 See, e.g., 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THREE EPISODES IN MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY 831-33
(Cambridge Riverside Press rev. ed. 1894) (describing attempts by numerous citizens to abate a
dam at an ironworks as a public nuisance because it prevented alewives from reaching upriver
ponds to spawn); E.N. HARTLEY, IRONWORKS ON THE SAUGUS 262-65 (1957) (describing
successive attempts by local citizens to destroy a dam at an ironworks); ef THEODORE
STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED 100-02 (1991) (detailing attempts to destroy dams that
flooded land, impeded navigation, and prevented transportation of logs to mills).
176 John F. Hart, FiXh, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth-Century Species Protection and
the Orginal Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REV. 287, 292 (2004). See generally
GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 404-07 (discussing the different problems faced and
methods used to ensure the passage of fish).
177 Hart, supra note 176, at 288-89 (stating that "occasionally dams were ordered to be torn
down altogether because they were found to be incompatible with fish passage").
178 NOvAK, supra note 7, at 19.
179 Wilson (1742-1798) was born near St. Andrews, Scotland. He immigrated to the United
States in 1765. He was elected to the Continental Congress in 1775 and signed the Declaration of
Independence the following year. Wilson participated in the drafting of the United States
Constitution and was a leader in the struggle for its adoption in Pennsylvania; his influence on
the final document was second only to that of James Madison. An ardent federalist, he was
appointed by President Washington to the Supreme Court in 1789. While serving on the Court,
Wilson also helped draft the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 and lectured in law at the
College of Philadelphia in 1789-1790. Perhaps the most important decision he authored on the
Court was Chisholm v. Georgi 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793)-a decision that was reversed with
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. His lectures in the law were posthumously published
in 1804. CHARLES P. SMITH, JAMES WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER 1742-1798 (1956).
180 Kent (1763-1847) was active in the Federalist party and served several terms in the New
York Legislature before he moved to New York City in 1793 where he became the first professor
law at Columbia College. He was appointed to the state supreme court in 1798, was made chief
judge in 1804, and became Chancellor (chief judge of the court of chancery) in 1814. As
Chancellor, Kent was instrumental in reviving equity which had lapsed following the American
Revolution. After his mandatory retirement in 1823, Kent again became a professor of law at
Columbia University for two years. Beginning in 1826, he published his lectures in a four-
volume, substantially expanded form as COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826-1830). James
Kent, Autobiographical Sketch of Chancellor Kent 1 S. L. Rev. 381 (1872).
181 Chipman (1752-1843) was Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court. He first
published his major work, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, in 1793; he
substantially expanded and elaborated the book in 1833. Roy J. Honeywell, Nathaniel Chipman:
Political Philosopher and Jurist, 5 New Eng. Q. 555, 555-56 (1932).
182 Swift (1759-1823) was a Connecticut jurist and sponsor of the Hartford Convention at
which representatives of the New England states considered but rejected seceding from the
Union. Swift published A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT in 1795-1796.
Elizabeth Forgens, An Unpublished Letter ofZephaniah Swift 11 New Eng. Q. 180, 180 (1938).
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were particularly important: saluspopuli suprema lex est (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedaus (use
your own property so as not to injure that of another).
In his 1845 book, A Selection of Legal Maxims, Herbert Broom placed
the sa/uspopuli maxim first because it is "of such universal application, and
result[s] so directly and manifestly from motives of public policy or simple
principles on which our social relations depend."' 3 He went on to explain
the maxim: "There is an implied assent on the part of every member of
society, that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to
that of the community; and that his property, liberty, and life shall, under
certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the
public good.""3 Although the principle applies most dramatically when
buildings are destroyed "for the preservation and defence of the kingdom" or
to "arrest the progress of a fire," the maxim "likewise applies to cases of
more ordinary occurrence, in which the Legislature ob publicam utLitatem,
disturbs the possession or restricts the enjoyment of property by
individuals.""8 5
Broom placed the sic utere tuo maxim first in his discussion of the
principles applicable to the rights and liabilities of property. 8 6 Nathaniel
Chipman went further, considering it to be a fundamental principle not only
of civil law, but also of natural law:
The first rule for the attainment of [the general utility, the general interest and
the happiness of man], is that rule of the civil law,-"so use your own right, that
you injure not the rights of others." This is not only a rule of civil law, but is a
general rule of the law of nature, subordinate to the more general rule, which
requires that all actions of individuals be so directed as to promote the good of
the whole. Each individual is supposed best to understand what will contribute
to his own interest and happiness, and the individuals of any society, what will
most contribute to the interest and prosperity of their society, and they will
pursue their own interest with more alacrity as well as knowledge. All have an
equal right to the pursuit, and to make use of all proper means; but if no limits
are set to the manner of the pursuit, some may usurp or monopolize the means
to the deprivation of others. They may, temporarily, increase their own
enjoyments, but are constantly exposed to the same deprivation by a more
powerful usurper.1
87
183 HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 1 (The Lawbook Exchange, 1992) (1845).
184 Id. at 2.
185 Id. at 3. The principle finds early expression in Mouse's Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341
(KB.), and The Case of the King's Prerogative in Salepetre, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (KB.).
186 BROOM, supra note 183, at 357.
187 NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 164-65 (Burlington,
Vt., 1833). James Wilson sounded a similar theme:
Nature has implanted in man the desire of his own happiness; she has inspired him with
many tender affections towards others, especially in the near relations of life; she has
endowed him with intellectual and with active powers; she has furnished him with a
natural impulse to exercise his powers for his own happiness, and the happiness of
those, for whom he entertains such tender affections. If all this be true, the undeniable
consequence is, that he has a right to exert those powers for the accomplishment of
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In addition to drawing upon the common law, this strand of American
jurisprudence reflected a philosophical foundation that rejected the
mechanistic, reductionist views of man-as-individual in a state of nature
popularized by Hobbes and others: 8  it was society-rather than
solitariness-that was natural. These writers found a sympathetic spirit in
Emer de Vattel, a natural law jurist who began with the proposition that
[m]an is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants, but
necessarily stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow-
creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the sake of perfecting
his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. This is
sufficiently proved by experience.'19
Since it was society that was the natural state of humans, society had claim
upon the individual and her property. One measure of society's claim was
the trust inherent in notions of state sovereign ownership.
B. The Rise of the Police Power
The early nineteenth century was a time of social and legal
transformation. In addition to the constitutional and jurisprudential changes
required by the political revolution and its shift from the sovereign as king-
in-Parliament to the sovereign as "We, the People," the stirrings of
industrialization and the increasing reach of the market also prompted
substantial changes in the law. Just as Arnold v. Mundy was part of the legal
transformation caused by the political revolution, Inhabitants of Stoughton
v. Bakerwas part of the social and economic revolution that transformed the
country from an agrarian-communitarian to a market-individualistic society.
As Morton Horowitz, James Willard Hurst, and other historians have noted,
the nineteenth century was a time of increasing judicial willingness to use
property as a tool to facilitate economic change. Growth was more
those purposes, in such manner, and upon such objects, as his inclination and judgment
shall direct; provided he does no injury to others; and provided more publick interests do
not demand his labours.
JAMES WILSON, Man as a Member of Society, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (James DeWitt
Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) (emphasis added).
188 See supra note 15.
189 VATTEL, supra note 14, at lix. Echoing Vattel, James Wilson wrote, "we are fitted and
intended for society, and... society is fitted and intended for us." WILSON, supra note 187, at
262; see also I ZEPHANIAH SwIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT § 3 [Of
Civil SocietjA (Arno Press 1972) (Windham, Conn., John Byrne 1795) (positing that mankind
resigns a part of its natural liberty in order to acquire civil liberty).
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important than protecting settled expectations."" As Hurst wrote, property
law itself became an "instrument of growth rather than merely security."l"'
Gary Kulik's study of the century-long struggle between farmers and
dam owners in northern Rhode Island provides a window into this
transformative period. The farmers sought to maintain traditional, public
rights to fish not only because fish were an important subsistence food item
but also because "they were defending a deeply held definition of the public
good and a sense of the proper balance between public and private rights"-
between "economic individualism and public virtue." 192 This conflict
surfaced with the erection of ironworks in the mid-eighteenth century. These
forges and furnaces, unlike grist and sawmills, required a continuous supply
of waterpower. Owners of the furnaces thus opposed statutory requirements
that dams include fishways since fishways required spilling water and thus
reduced efficiency and potential output. In addition, the furnaces (and the
cotton mills that succeeded them) were market concerns, owned by
capitalists living outside the community, employing wage workers, and
producing commodities for regional, national, or international markets.
The struggle between farmers and dam owners was largely played out
in the legislature as each sought statutes protecting their differing visions of
the public good. As market relations increasingly supplanted the
communitarian economic order based on subsistence, barter, and limited
markets, the growing economic individualism was reflected in an increasing
number of petitions signed not only by furnace and mill owners, but also by
freemen of the community. The corporations gradually succeeded in
190 Hence the importance of the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence on vested rights
and the Contract Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. For cases tracing the rise and decline of the
Contract Clause, see Fletcher v Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Sturgis v. Crowinsiield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Providence Bank v Billings, 29 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 514 (1830); Beaty v. Knowles, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152 (1830); and Charles River Bridge Co. v
Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 127-59, 203-36
(1985) (noting that the Contract Clause was the basis for the largest group of cases decided by
the Marshall Court); STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 18-20 (1971)
(examining the Charles River Bridge Case in which the Court held that granting a charter to a
new free bridge did not invade any vested rights of the owners of the existing toll bridge); C.
PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO vii (1966) (describing how the case of Fletcher v. Peckbecame a major
precedent "for regulating the relationship between government and business"); FRANCIS N.
STITES, PRIVATE INTEREST PUBLIC GAIN (1972) 99-113 (describing how the Court used Dartmouth
College v. Woodward to "infusle] the doctrine of vested rights into the contract clause of the
national Constitution"); 1 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 229-47, 290-94 (explaining
Chief Justice Marshall's belief that the contract clause of the Constitution authorized the federal
government to support national economic development, and describing Chief Justice Taney's
subsequent concurrence in that belief); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1-88 (1938) (describing the economic forces and attitudes that led to the rise of
the contract clause). For examples of the impact of this jurisprudence on wildlife, see People v.
Platt, 17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. 1819), and State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 321 (1859).
191 HURST, supra note 7, at 28. Property became an "instrumental value in the service of the
paramount goal of promoting economic growth." HOROwrrz, supra note 7, at 53.
192 Kulik, supra note 174, at 29-34; see also John T. Cumbler, The Early Making of
Environmental Consciousness: Fish, Fisheries Commissions, and the Connecticut River, ENVTL.
HIST. REV., Winter 1991, at 73 (examining the relationship between farmers and dam owners).
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obtaining exemptions from statutes requiring dams to be constructed with
suitable fish passage facilities. But it was not until the nineteenth century
that the matter was finally settled in favor of the mill owners. They were able
to change both the patterns of river use and the laws protecting fishing
rights. With the exemption of dams from the requirement of fishways, the
legislature chose economic development and private gain; both farmers and
fish lost.
193
As nineteenth century American society changed under the pressures of
industrialization and urbanization, legislation increasingly became the
primary method of making law.' 94 This reallocation of power between courts
and legislatures required the courts, supplanted as the chief lawmakers, to
explain the nature of the state's power to keep the society "well-regulated."
A key decision, carrying forward old common-law ideals while giving shape
to the new understanding of state power, was an opinion written by Chief
Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth
V. Alger.
195
Alger was an appeal by Cyrus Alger of his conviction under a statute
that prohibited the construction of wharves into the Boston harbor beyond a
specified line. After exhaustively reviewing the nature of Alger's title to the
land in question and concluding that he owned the land upon which he had
built the wharf,196 Shaw turned to the question of the state's power to
prohibit the use of privately owned land. He began with the king's
prerogative: the land in question, he noted, is subject to the dominion of the
state as heir to "the king's prerogative [which] extended to the dominion and
control of the shores of the sea, as a power held in trust for the security and
protection of the public rights of navigation and fisheries." 9 ' This royal
193 See HOROWITZ, supra note 7, at 31-62 (exploring fish and dam conflicts in Massachusetts);
NELSON, supra note 7, 145-64 (discussing the trend of industrial interests prevailing in courts);
see also ADAMs, supra note 175, at 831 (describing conflict over alewives migrating to the
Braintree ponds); STEINBERG, supra note 175, at 100-10 (discussing hydropower in the Lake
Winnipesauke area). On the environmental impacts of the early ironworks, see ROBERT G.
GORDON, A LANDSCAPE TRANSFORMED (2001); Kulik, supra note 174.
194 In part this reflects the transformation in the understanding of sovereignty. When "We,
the people" are the sovereign, the legitimacy of law-making becomes increasingly suspect the
further that it is removed from the people. The codification movement of the antebellum period
reflects a similar perspective. COOK, supra note 7.
195 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). The decision has been called "one of the most influential
and frequently cited [opinions] in constitutional law." LEVY, supra note 140, at 248. Ernst
Freund, in contrast, harrumphed that, although the decision "is generally treated as one of the
leading cases," its definition of the police power is "very vague, and its application to the case in
hand... is based upon no intelligible principle." ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 405, at 425
(1904). Freund himself spent more than 800 pages on his definition. On the context of the
decision, see generally NOvAS, supra note 7.
196 The court held that Alger was the owner of the land where he had built the wharf
because, under a colonial ordinance enacted in 1647, all grants made by the government that
were bounded by the sea "or places where the tide ebbed and flowed" conveyed "a fee to the
low water mark, or one hundred rods." 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 81.
197 Id at 83. "[Tlhese were among the regalia or incidents of sovereignty." Id. Shaw
subsequently restated this conclusion by noting that the right of property (the jusprivatum) is
subject to the government's regulatory powers (the jus publicum)-and the jus publicum is
nothing other than "the royal prerogative" or the "royal right" that is vested in the government.
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prerogative in navigable waters was "juspublicum,... held by the crown in
trust" so that even when such land was granted to a private individual it
remained impressed with the trust.198
Furthermore, this prerogative power extends beyond navigable waters:
"it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use may be so
regulated, that it shall not be... injurious to the rights of the community."199
This public-interest limitation applies to "[a]ll property in this
commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering on tide
waters."200 Among the analogous situations that Shaw offered as examples
was the "right of the public to have [non-navigable] rivers kept open and free
for the migratory fish, such as salmon, shad, and alewives, to pass from the
sea, through such rivers to the ponds and head waters, to cast their
spawn. "201
Shaw's "settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil
society," reflected the traditional common-law perspective on the nature of
the relationship between public and private interests. As Shaw noted in





These cases mark out fuzzy lines between four categories that remain
central to natural resource law: commons, capture, public trust, and private
property in land. How can they inform our understanding of current debates
about the conservation of wildlife? What do they have to say about the
restrictions on the use of private property in land to protect endangered
species or ecosystem services?
The starting point is the unusual legal status of animals ferae naturae. In
part, this status reflects our fraught and ambiguous relationship to animals,
Id at 90.
198 Id
199 Id. at 84-85. On the concept of a "well ordered civil society," see NOVAK, supra note 7.
200 Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 85. The decision is not entirely consistent on the scope of the
police power: in some places Shaw seems to tie it to tidal lands, id at 81-83, 90-91, 93
(recognizing the "royal prerogative" in places where the tide ebbed and flowed); and in others
he speaks far more broadly, id at 84-86, 88 (recognizing the "settled principle" that property is
subject to government regulation for the public good). In part, of course, the inconsistency may
be more apparent than real since the case before the court concerned tidelands and it is to be
expected that the court would focus on such lands. In addition, Shaw argued that restrictions
fall more heavily on the seashore because there is a public right to use the sea, "so that such
estate should be held subject to somewhat more restrictive regulations in its use, than interior
and upland estate remote from place which the public have common right." Id. at 95.
201 Id at 98. The "most important" of the cases cited for this principle was Inhabitants of
Stoughton v. Baker. Id at 99-101.
202 Alger, 1 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 88-89. Other courts also agreed with this principle. See, e.g,
People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897); Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 588 (1884);
Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222 (1835); Burnham v. Webster, 5 Mass. 266 (1809); West Point Water
Power & Land Improvement Co. v. State ex rel. Moodie, 66 N.W. 6 (Neb. 1896); Hooker v.
Cummings, 20 Johns. 90 (N.Y. 1822).
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the "others" that have always occupied a unique niche in human
consciousness. We have largely defined our "human-ness" in contrast to
them-they are the symbols that people our thoughts and dreams: the
Grimm Brother's wolf at the door; Reynard the crafty fox of medieval market
dramas (and the dissent in Pierson v. Pos/°3); and the magical, ambiguous
coyote of so many Indian stories. Paul Shepard argued that "the human
species emerged enacting, dreaming, and thinking animals and cannot be
fully itself without them."204 This relationship is only partially and, even then
imperfectly, captured by crude concepts of property.
Animals ferae naturae are also unusual even as a legal category given
the special relationship between wildlife and the state.20 5 Despite continued
repetition of the once-upon-a-time story of Pierson v. Post in first-year
property classes, wild animals are not now a conmon-access resource, nor
were they in 1805.2"6 Commons, as free-access, are and always have been
uncommon at common law. Wild animals have been the object of intense
legal concern for nearly a millennium. For at least that long, governments
have treated them as a public resource, extensively regulating their capture
and the destruction of their habitat.
20 7
203 3 Cal. 175, 180 (N.Y. 1805).
204 SHEPARD, supra note 38, at 4.
205 This relationship is also echoed in the context of another resource that is subject to
capture: in western water law where, water also is owned by the public. E.g, IDAHO CONST. art.
XV, § 1 (declaring the use of all waters in the state to be public); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3)
(recognizing existing water rights and declaring that the "use of water... shall be held to be a
public use"); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (1997) ("All water within the state from all sources of
water supply belongs to the public."); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.03.005 (1992 & Supp. 1998) ("It is
the policy of the state to promote the use of the public waters in a fashion which provides for
obtaining maximum net benefits arising from both diversionary uses of the state's public waters
and the retention of waters within streams and lakes in sufficient quantity and quality to protect
instream and natural values and rights."); see also Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammon
Packing Co., 236 P. 764 (Wyo. 1925) (recognizing the right of the state to deny an appropriation
if it contravenes the public welfare).
206 The Case of Swans, (1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435, 438 (K.B.).
207 The English government imposed a wide variety of hunting and habitat-altering
restrictions to conserve wildlife. In addition to declaring lands "forest" and thus protected,
prohibitions on burning of "Grig, Ling, Heath, Furze, Gosse, or fern," from February through
June to protect grouse were adopted in 1692. An Act for the More Easy Discovery and
Conviction of Such as Shall Destroy the Game of this Kingdom, 4 W. & M., c. 23, § 9 (1692).
When the statute prohibiting the burning of heath proved insufficient to deter illegal habitat
destruction, Parliament prohibited unlicensed persons from selling fern ashes. An Act for the
Better Preservation of the Game, 6 Ann. c. 16, § 5 (1706). See also An Act for the Preventing the
Burning or Destroying of Goss, Furze or Ferne, in Forests or Chaces, 28 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 3 (1755)
(prohibiting burning to protect habitat). In 1285, for example, Parliament enacted closed
seasons on the taking of salmon. Statute of Westminister II, 13 Edw., c. 47 (1285); see also An
Act Agaynst Tracing of Hares, 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1523) (specifying penalty for tracing hares);
An Acte Ayenst Destruccyon of WildFowle, 25 Hen. 8, c. 11, § 1 (1533) (prohibiting capture of
wildfowl from May through August); An Act for the Preservation of the Game of Pheasants and
Partridges, and againste the destroyinge of Hares with Harepipes and tracinge Hares in the
Snowe, 1 Jac. 1, c. 27, § 6 (1604) (placing limits on birds that can be shot). A statute enacted in
1393 strengthened these restrictions and also restricted habitat alteration by mandating that all
dams include weirs "of reasonable Wideness" to permit the fish to reach upstream spawning
areas. Justices of the Peace Shall be Conservators of the Statutes Made Touching Salmons, 17
Rich. 2, c. 9 (1393). Lawmakers also relied upon bag limits, e.g., An Acte for Preservation of
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In England, courts conceived of this special relationship in terms of the
Crown's prerogative, a blending of property and sovereignty. But royal
prerogative was extinguished by the American Revolution-hence the
struggle in Amold v. Mund 2 °8 and its progeny to reconceive the legal status
of animals ferae naturae and to find a new language to express that
relationship. Since the relationship between society and animals did not
change, the courts followed the formula inherited from England but
transformed it to reflect the difference between monarchy and republic: the
state's relationship to animals ferae naturae was reconceived as a blending
of proprietary power and sovereign power-an ownership based on the
government's status as sovereign.
But this formulation created its own problems. To speak of ownership
requires ignoring several traditional indicia of property. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes noted in an echo of Pierson v. Post
To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild
birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of
ownership. The whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within
their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in
another State and in a week a thousand miles away.
209
Similarly, the state-as-owner has none of the liabilities that traditionally
accompany ownership. 21° The state's interest is, at best, a metaphorical form
of property.
At the same time, to speak of the relationship as simply "regulatory" is
also problematic. The lesson of Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Bake2 u is that
the public's interest in wildlife is more than simply regulatory. Treating the
power as regulatory, for example, raises questions of takings that are alien
to wildlife law: landowners hold their property subject to the limitation that
they must not use the land to destroy the wildlife that frequents it.212 The
Spawne and Frye of Fishe, 1 Eliz., ch. 17, § 2 (1558) (limiting the length of fish that could be
taken); gear restrictions, e.g., No Man Shall Fasten Nets to Any Thing over Rivers, 2 Hen. 6, c. 15
(1423) (prohibiting the use of nets) and An Act for the Preservation of Fishing in the River of
Severne, 30 Car. 2, c. 9 (1678) (limiting the months in which nets were permitted); and
prohibitions on commerce to conserve and to allocate wildlife, e.g., Partriches and Faysante 32
Hen. 8, ch. 8 (1540)) (prohibiting the sale of partridge and pheasant to anyone not an officer of
the royal household) and An Act for the Better Preservation of the Game, 6 Ann., c. 16, § 2
(1706) (prohibiting the possession of certain wild animals for some citizens).
208 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
209 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
210 Eg, Moerman v. State, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. App. 1993) (discussing a landowner who
sought compensation from the state for property damage due to elk herd relocated on
property); Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that the state was not liable for
protected beavers that felled trees); Cook v. State, 74 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1937) (holding state not
liable for damage to skating rink from protected beavers that dammed the water source).
211 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 522 (1808).
212 Eg, United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that landowner had no power to construct fence that excluded wildlife from reaching
checkerboarded public lands); Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 934 (Fla.
1995) (holding that a prohibition on the construction of a fence that restricted deer from freely
crossing private land did not violate due process or result in taldng of property); State v. Sour
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public's interest in wildlife, in other words, is a limitation on the title to
private property. Landowners generally do not have a right to capture
wildlife on their land to protect the land from damage213 or to fence their
property to keep wildlife out.214 Landowners also have no claim against the
government for damage to land by animals 215 even when the animals have
been reintroduced by the state.216 Similarly, the denial of a permit to develop
land to protect wildlife is not a compensable taking because there is no right
to change the uses of land.217 Wildlife protection, in other words, is more
Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that the erection of
3500 foot-long, "snake proof" fence that was intended to exclude migrating rattlesnakes is an
unlawful taking of the snakes under state endangered species act).
213 There is, for example, no right to take game on one's land. Cawsey v. Brickey, 144 P. 938,
939 (Wash. 1914) ("There is no private right in the citizen to take fish or game, except as either
expressly given or inferentially suffered by the state."); State v. Herwig, 117 N.W.2d 335, 339-40
(Wis. 1962) (holding that the state can regulate hunting rights on one's private land because the
wildlife is owned by the state for the benefit of the people). There is also no right to hunt out of
season. E.g, Maitland v. People, 23 P.2d 116, 117 (Colo. 1933) (holding that the creation of a
game refuge which included plaintiffs private property was constitutional because the state can
regulate hunting even on private property). Furthermore, capturing an animal that is damaging
one's property is also generally impermissible. Compare Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1337
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1989) (holding that
regulations preventing the killing of federally protected species do not violate the Fifth
Amendment); and State v. Thompson, 33 P.3d 213, 216 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a
statute that prohibited killing deer out of season was a reasonable limit on private property
rights); andState v. Cleve, 980 P.2d 23, 29, 37 (N.M. 1999) (finding that defendant illegally killed
deer that came on his property); and State v. Vander Houwen, 115 P.3d 399, 404 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005) (finding that the state presented enough evidence to support the defendant's conviction
for hunting wild game on his land), Kith Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 423 (1873) (holding that
a property owner may defend his geese against mink even under a statute prohibiting the killing
of mink at certain times of year); andCook v. State, 714 P.2d 199, 203 (Wash. 1937) (holding that
"one has the constitutional right to defend and protect his property, against imminent and
threatened injury by a protected animal ...."); andState v. Cross, 370 P.2d 371, 378 (Wyo. 1962)
(holding that one may use force in protecting his property against wild animals as a last resort).
For an overview of cases and statutes discussing whether there is a right for a landowner to
defend one's property from wildlife, see generally GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 2, at 240-43.
214 Eg., United States exrel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 980 (1988) (fencing off public land kept pronghorn sheep from winter grazing range);
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1995) (fencing held harmful to deer
habitat); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (fencing
interfered with migration pattern of endangered timber rattlesnake).
215 E.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) (denying claim
for damage caused by grazing of federally protected horses and burros); Leger v. Louisiana, 306
So. 2d 391 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (holding state not responsible for damage caused to private
property by wild deer); Cook v. State, 74 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1937) (relieving state of liability for
damage caused to a waterway by state-protected beavers).
216 E.g., Moerman v. State, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
Moerman v. California, 511 U.S. 1031 (1994) (denying claim for damage caused by reintroduced
elk on the basis that they are not instrumentalities of the state); Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1917) (barring claim against the state for damage to timber caused by reintroduced
beavers).
217 Eg., Southview Assoc. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987
(1993) (affirming dismissal of a takings claim where state denied development permit to
preserve deer habitat). Cf Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) ("An owner
of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his
land.").
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than regulation; 218 in the modem terminology, it is a "background principle"
incident to owning property in land.
21
1
Finally, the blending of property and sovereignty is also problematic
because the government's powers are constrained by the public interest.
Thus the trust metaphor: state sovereign ownership is a public trust that
must be exercised to protect the public's interest in wildlife.22 ° But the trust
metaphor is also imperfect. The state often seems to have the powers of a
trustee but not the accompanying responsibilities. States as trustees can, for
example, obtain compensation for damage to wildlife, 22 but courts have
been far less willing to impose trust obligations on the state, generally
218 Again, water is analogous. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892)
(noting the public character of state ownership of navigable waters); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723-24 (Cal.), cert. deied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (illustrating the
public trust doctrine as it relates to navigable waters).
219 Sierra Club v. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(depublished). The state's interest also impacts other federal constitutional claims. For
example, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not preclude a
warrantless search of a wholesale fish dealer to determine the source of fish on the company's
premises given the "state's obligation as trustee... 'to exercise continued supervision over the
trust' to prevent parties from using the trust in a harmful manner." People v. Harbor Hut Rest.,
196 Cal. Rptr. 7, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d
709, 721 (Cal. 1983)). For other examples of judicial approval of warrantless searches based on
states' duties as trustees of wildlife resources, see Taliman v. Department ofNatural Resources,
333 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), remanded, 365 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. 1985); State v. MarcoiV
309 A.2d 505 (N.H. 1973); State v. Nobles, 422 S.E.2d 78 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), ad, 429 S.E.2d
716 (N.C. 1993) (per curiam); State v. Westside Fish Co., 570 P.2d 401 (Or. App. 1977); and
Washington v. Mach, 594 P:2d 1361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
220 See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411 (1842) (holding that in granting partially
submerged land to the Duke of York, the King was powerless to abbrogate the common law
right to continue fishing in the waters and that this right survived beyond New Jersey
statehood); People v. Brady, 286 Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that state
ownership of abalone gives rise to a duty to protect the shellfish for the public trust); Peck v.
Lockwood, 5 Day 22, 128 (Conn. 1811) (holding that the right to take shellfish on the land of an
individual between the high and low water-mark is a common right); Attorney Gen. v. Hermes,
339 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that a state could seek civil damages based
on its sovereign ownership of wildlife); Oregon v. Couch, 103 P.3d 671, 678 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that state sovereign ownership of wildlife is limited to animals "in a state of nature and
at large," and not previously subject to lawful capture (quoting State v. Pulos, 129 P. 128, 130
(Or. 1913))); State v. Herwig, 117 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Wisc. 1962) (stating that hunting regulations
"in the interest of conservation" are an appropriate exercise of the state's police power).
221 E.g, State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974) (holding that the
state can sue a city for fish killed by negligent operation of a municipal sewage treatment plant);
State Dep't of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the
state is entitled to damages for destruction of salmon spawning habitat); In re Steuart Transp.
Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding both state and United States can obtain
damages for pollution-killed waterfowl under both public trust and parens patria); see also
Maryland Dep't of Natural Res. v. Amerada Hess Co., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972)
(holding that Maryland could maintain a common law action for relief in a pollution discharge
case despite lack of state legislation on the issue); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097,
1100 (D. Me. 1973) (finding that Maine had sufficient interest in its coastal waters and marine
life to support a suit for damages under its parens patriae capacity). Other fact patterns have
also produced litigation. E.g, United States v. Burlington N. R.R., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1286 (D.
Neb. 1989) (involving wildlife losses due to fire caused by locomotive); Attorney Gen. v.
Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (awarding damages based on wholesale
value of fish taken by commercial fisher in violation of state law).
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holding that it is for the legislature (or its delegatee) to determine the
applicable duties.222
This is, at least in part, a semantic problem: "property" and
"sovereignty" are seldom more than conclusory ciphers loaded with
ideological baggage.22 3 As the Supreme Court has noted, state ownership is a
"legal fiction"-but one that expresses "the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource." 24 As thenJustice Rehnquist noted, although a state does not
"own" animals ferae naturae "in any conventional sense of the word," this
does not mean that "the concept expressed by the 'ownership' doctrine is
obsolete"; rather, the concept reflects the Court's long recognition that "the
ownership language... is simply a shorthand way of describing a State's
substantial interest in preserving and regulating ... the fish and game .... 2 25
222 Despite early cases employing broad public trust language, for example Diil v. Wareham,
48 Mass. (7 Met.) 438, 445 (1844), the argument that the state was prohibited from destroying
public rights for private gain was almost uniformly rejected when made in the context of access
to or conservation of wildlife. See, e.g., Munson v. Baldwin, 7 Conn. 168, 171 (1828) (construing
a statute granting limited title to a person who clears and uses a fishing place, "so long as they
continue to use the same, for the purpose of fishing"); Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353
(1841) (holding construction of a private dam across a navigable river, when authorized by state
law, does not give a cause of action when the dam reduces access to the fishery); Brinckerhoff
v. Starkins, 11 Barb. 248, 250-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851) (stating the "general rule... that no
person can acquire an exclusive right, in navigable waters, except by grant from the sovereign
power, or by prescription .... ."); Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 Serg. & Rawle 71 (Pa.
1826) (holding state charter authorizing construction of a dam relieved the dam owner of
liability for harm to fisheries); State v. Cozzens, 2 R.I. 561, 565 (1850) (upholding a statute
permitting the lease of oyster beds covered by public waters, "to secure to the public a more
abundant supply."). The recurrent rationale was that offered by Chief Justice Shaw in
Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 239, 247 (1859): "It is... for the legislature to
determine which [public right] shall yield, and to what extent, and whether wholly, or in part
only, to the other; and such question will ordinarily be determined by the legislature, according
to their conviction of the greater preponderance of public necessity and convenience." Courts
have been more willing recently to reinvigorate public trust requirements. See Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
977 (1983) ("[ecological [values such as] the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds ...
[are] among the purposes of the public trust."); Texas East Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Pres.,
Inc., 225 A.2d 130, 137 (N.J. 1966) ("[D]efendant's devotion of its land to a purpose which is
encouraged and often engaged in by government itself gives it a somewhat more potent claim to
judicial protection against taking of its preserve or a portion of it by arbitrary action of a
condemnor."); see also Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France & Lisa A. Hallenbeck, The Public
Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wldlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 87, 88 (1995) (asserting that "[a]s trustee, the state must protect the corpus of its
wildlife trust by preventing its unreasonable exploitation and by seeking compensation for
unavoidable losses").
223 See Alf Ross, Th-Th, 70 HARv. L. REV. 812, 818 (1957) ("our terminology and our ideas bear
a considerable structural resemblance to primitive magic thought concerning the invocation of
supernatural powers which in turn are converted into factual effects").
224 Toomer v. Witsel, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948); see also Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431
U.S. 265, 284 (1976) ("The 'ownership' language.., must be understood as no more than a
nineteenth-century legal fiction expressing 'the importance to its people that a State have power
to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.'").
225 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 341-42 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
Baldwin v. Mont. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 382, 392 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(the state ownership doctrine "manifests the State's special interest in regulating and preserving
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That is to say: the public's interest in wildlife-whether characterized as a
trust, state ownership, state custodianship, or a "substantial interest in
preserving" such animals-gives the state a special authority and
responsibility to ensure the preservation of wildlife.
There is, in short, ample power to conserve the nation's biodiversity
and the ecosystem services on which we depend. Having power and
exercising it are, of course, different things, particularly in these uncertain
times. Given the failure of political will or the purchase of political power, de
facto commons are common, and the public interest is often swamped by
private gain.
wildlife .... Whether we describe this interest as proprietary or otherwise is not significant").
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